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CANLAWAND ECONOMICS
BE BOTH PRACTICAL
AND
PRINCIPLED?
David A. HofSman*
Michael P. 0'Shes**
'Be it my will that my justice be ruled by my mercy.' That is a
prayer which we all need to utter at times when the demon of
formalism tempts the intellect with the lure of scientific order.'

I.

PRINCIPLED
AND PRACTICAL
COMMITMENTS IN LAWAND
ECONOMICS

A.

Moral and Practical Normative Questions
I . Identifying the Commitments That Underlie a
Position in Law and Economics
2. Criticism of the Ideal of Completeness

Clerk to the Hon. Norma L. Shapiro. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. B.A., 1998, Yale; J.D., 2001, Harvard. We owe a great deal to the individuals
who helped us to produce this Article. Jon Hanson provided encouragement and academic support from the very beginning. Daniel Filler's contribution to the editing process was invaluable.
Dan Markel and Rudi Seitz provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. We are also grateful for
the inspiration of our roommates. friends, and families. One of us dedicates his work on this
Article to Deborah Tillie Filler, the other to the memory of Harriet D. Buchholz. Finally, we are
indebted to Harvard Law School's John M. Olin Center for Law. Economics and Business for
financial support. The views presented are ours alone. as are any errors.
*'
Clerk to the Hon. John R. Gibson, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. B.A.,
1995, Harvard; M.A., 1998. U. of Pittsburgh; J.D. 2001. Harvard.
BENJAMIN CARDOZO,THE NATUREOF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 66 (1921).
1.
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B.

Past and Present Moral Positions in Law and
Economics
I . Wealth Maximization and its Critics
2. Well-Being: A Comprehensive Approach
3. Well-Being: Restricted Views
a. Matthew Addler and Eric Posner
b. Howard Chang
C. Past Approaches to the Practical Question in Law and
Economics
I . Textbook Cost-Benefit Analysis
a. The Concept of Willingness to Pay
b. The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion
2. ' Challenging the Consensus: Behavioral Research
D. Contemporary Approaches to the Practical Question
I . Adler and Posner's Improved Cost-Benefir
Analysis
2. Professors Kaplow and Shave11
a. Attitude Toward Orthodox Parentianism
b. Attitude Toward Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Wealth Effects
c. Preferences: How Are They Identified?
1.
Uninformed or Self Defeating Preferences
ii.
Apparent Preferences That
Are a Product of Framing
Effects
d. How Should Preferences Be Measured?
E. The Consequences of Privileging Preferences
11.

EVIDENCE OF LAW-RELATED
PREFERENCES
A. The Moral Relevance of Law-Related Preferences
B. Tastesfor Procedural Justice
I . Procedural Justice in Review
2. Competing Explanatory Models
3. Objections to the Procedural Preference Literature
a. Are Laboratory Results Real?
b. Is the Procedural Preference Literature
Methodologically Flawed?
c. Do Procedural Preferences Convey
Relevant Welfare Information ?
C. Tastes for Legal Rules

Law and Economics

Preferences for Rules
Specific Applications
D. (Dis)tnstesfor Economic Decision Making
1. W. Kip Viscusi and the Anti- Utilitarian Jury
2. Cass Sunstein, and the Anti-Utilitarian Law
Students
3. W. Kip Viscusi Returns with Yet More Bad
News
4. Jonathan Baron, and the Need for Education
E. The Possible Scope of Anti-Utilitarian and Other LawRelated Preferences
1.
2.

III.

CAN A PREFERENCE-BASED
LEGALPOLICY CO-EXISTWITH
DEMOCRACY?
A. Problems Confronting Normative Law and Economics
1. Developing Improved Practical Techniques to
Measure Welfare
2. Law-Related Preferences as Components of
Welfare
3. Law-Related Preferences as Influences on the
Behavior of Legal Actors
B. Hiding the Ball: Secrecy as a Response to Law-Related
Preferences
1. Possible Policies of Secrecy
2. Problems with Secrecy
C. Giving the Ball to Bureaucrats: Regulatory Responses
to Anti-Utilitarian Preferences
D. See Spot Run, See Spot Jump, See Spot Perform the
Welfare Calculus: Re-Education as a Response to AntiUtilitarian Preferences
E. Limiting the Scope of Law and Economics Based Reform

IV.

CONCLUSION

The law and economics2 movement today is in a vigorous ferment.
In recent years, law and economics scholars have started to explore
both the psychological and philosophical foundations of their discipline
2.
In this Article. "law and economics" means normative law and economics. Normative
law and economics "recommend[s] changes that might improve" the legal system. while positive
law and economics simply "explains[s] the legal system as it is" by charting its economic effects.
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAWAND ECONOMICS
xiv (2d ed. 1989).
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with a new seriou~ness.~
Correspondingly, their proposals for reforming the legal system have begun to change. There is a sense afoot that
adjusting the legal system to serve economic goals is more complicated
than was previously appreciated and may require significant political or
institutional changes. Some scholars respond to this development by
scaling back their ambitions; they offer limited defenses of the current
uses of economic techniques by government actors such as regulatory
agencies. Others, however, still hope to extend the domain of economics into the common law. These more ambitious scholars are increasingly forced to consider policies of paternalism.
Consider the following proposals, all discussed by economically
minded scholars within the past four years:
An economist, reacting to experimental data showing that citizens (especially racial minorities) refuse to obey efficient rules
for setting punitive damages in tort, concludes that this data
supports proposals to entrust punitive damages to judges or to
eliminate them entirely in some cases.4
A prominent, moderate legal theorist mulls the idea of removing
the tort system from the hands of citizens by transferring judicial and legislative power to unelected bureaucrats, reasoning
that such bureaucrats could be trusted to further the economic
goal of optimal deterrence "whatever ordinary people think.

"'

A psychologist, reacting to evidence of a popular distaste for
utilitarianism, encourages parents to buy their children worldsimulating computer games to overcome mental barriers to consequentialist thinking and encourages elementary schoolteachers
to alter their curricula in order to teach pupils the moral precepts of ~tilitarianism.~
Two Harvard law professors reason that "political actors" like
judges, in response to "citizens' limited capacities" to comprehend economic analysis, may need to hide the true bases of
their decisions by couching their public statements in a "lan3.
The current debate about foundations has produced book-length contributions. See COSTAND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES
(Matthew D. Adler
BENEFIT ANALYSIS:LEGAL, ECONOMIC
& Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) [hereinafter COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS];Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV.L. REV. 961 (2001); BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
4.
See W . Kip Viscusi. The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 313, 342-44 (2001); see also infra Parts II.D.1, II.D.3.
5.
See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal
Deterrence? 29 J. LEGALSTUD. 237, 250 (2000); see also infra Part II.D.2.
6.
See JONATHAN
BARON, JUDGMENT
MISGUIDED: INTUITION AND ERRORIN PUBLIC
DECISION MAKING
201 (1998); see also infra Parts II.D.4, 1II.C.
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"'

These proposals reflect an important tension that affects law and
economics today. The tension occurs as analysts try to reconcile the
techniques of economics with an improving understanding of how people behave and of what they want from their legal system. The purpose
of this Article is to describe this tension; to point out recent psychological evidence that sharpens it; and then to consider some prospects
for resolving the tension, whether by paternalism or by other means.
In Part I, we identify a source of the tension-the current efforts to
supply a plausible moral foundation for law and economics. After explaining the basic concepts used in economic analysis, we examine past
attempts to provide a principled justification for using economics to
reform the legal system. We suggest that these attempts largely failed,
so that legal economists have generally proceeded without a wellarticulated moral basis. Recently, however, scholars have begun serious
efforts to pay off this overdue debt. In accord with several recent authors, we conclude that a good justification of law and economics must
pass a two-part test; it must be both morally principled and feasible to
apply in practice.
In Part 11, we seek to add something to the debate by presenting
empirical evidence that this test may be harder to meet than scholars
have recognized. We outline psychological research suggesting that
normal citizens may have law-related preferences-preferences about
the content and fairness of their legal system. While law-related preferences are tough to measure in traditional market terms, we think the
evidence for them is too strong to be simply ignored by economists,
especially since they are likely to influence the behavior of jurors, litigants, and voters. Most intriguingly, the studies suggest that in certain
cases people prefer that legal decisions not be made on an economic
basis.
In Part 111, we offer predictions about the further development of
law and economics in light of the discipline's growing theoretical sophistication and the evidence of law-related preferences. The most
compelling options are: (1) various forms of paternalism, whether by
excluding citizens from participation in the legal system or by discounting some types of individual preferences from consideration in choosing
policies, and (2) a limited implementation of economic techniques, applying them strongly in some areas of the law and not others. We also
discuss ways in which paternalistic approaches may be counterproductive. We conclude by giving our answer to the question that both titles
7.

See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1319.
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and motivates the Article.

I.

PRINCIPLED
AND PRACTICAL
COMMITMENTS
IN LAW
AND ECONOMICS

Most lawyers and law students are familiar with some of the policy
recommendations made by different legal economists. Different scholars have argued that strict product liability should be replaced with a
negligence rule;' that, to the contrary, product manufacturers should be
subjected to a more pro-plaintiff standard of "enterprise liabilit~;"~
that
the punishment for a given crime should be made stiffer as the likelihood decreases that violators will be caught;'' and that corporate managers should sometimes be permitted to engage in insider trading of
their own corporation's stock."
Scholars coinrnonly justify these changes in the law on the grounds
that they would increase "social wealth" or "social welfare." But these
are technical concepts borrowed from the discipline of economics.
There has rarely been explicit discussion of how this jargon relates to
appealing moral foundations. For example, do legal rules that increase
"social wealth" thereby promote interests that Americans value? Conversely, when analysts do lay out their moral assumptions, it is often
unclear how a judge or bureaucrat who is sympathetic to economic aims
can put them into practice. How can a legal decision-maker with limited
resources confidently maximize "social welfare" on a case-by-case basis?
Our aim in this part is to suggest what good answers to these questions should be like. As one touchstone, we will use the recent work of
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell. Their important new article, Fairness Versus W e l f a r e , defends a vision of law and economics that is
founded on the moral assumptions of welfare economics, a field whose
insights, Kaplow and Shavell claim, have not been fully incorporated
into previous s~holarship.'~
Kaplow and Shavell argue that economists
should take account of all individual preferences about the legal system

8.
See GARYT. SCHWARTZ.
T H E VITALITY
OF NEGLIGENCE
AND THE ETHICSOF STRICT
LIABILITY
(1981).
9.
See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case For
Enterprise Liability. 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 787 (1993).
10. See George J. Stigler, The Optimrun Enforcement of Law, in ESSAYSI N THE ECONOMICS
OF CRIMEAND PUNISHMENT 55, 56 (Gary S. Becker et al. eds., 1974) (arguing that significant
increases in sanctions would lead to greater deterrence).
11. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIELR. FISCHEL,THEECONOMIC
STRUCTURE
OF
CORPORATE LAW 253-75 (1991) (offering economic critique of the restrictions on insider trading
imposed by federal securities laws).
12. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3. at 967-76.
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and its objects, regardless of the content of those preferences.13 Like a
taste for "art, nature, or fine wine," Kaplow and Shave11 argue, moral
beliefs about the legal system should influence the policy choices made
by legal analysts and decision-makers.14 Our second touchstone is recent work by Matthew Adler and Eric Posner. Adler and Posner have,
to date, made the most sophisticated attempt to connect common economic techniques to plausible moral principles."
In Part I.A, we introduce a conceptual framework that distinguishes
the moral component of a position in law and economics from the procedures that must be used to implement it. In Part I.B, we discuss the
different moral principles that have been put forward as possible justifications for law and economics reform. This discussion concludes by
presenting the leading moral positions in contention today: Kaplow's
and Shavellys view that preferences should be satisfied regardless of
their content, and the view of other analysts that only some preferences
are morally relevant.
Next, in Part I.C, we explain the economic procedure of costbenefit analysis, which has been the default technique used by scholars
to choose among competing legal rules. We then describe the ways that
recent scholarship in behavioral psychology has undermined many of
the assumptions of traditional cost-benefit analysis. In Part I.D, we
survey (and criticize) current attempts to develop improved procedures
that incorporate better information about individual well-being than
traditional cost-benefit analysis. Finally, Part 1.E sets out problems that
can arise when the moral positions favored by current analysts are
combined with practical positions committed to using information besides market prices to measure preferences.

A. Moral and Practical Normative Questions
I.

Identiaing the Commitments That Underlie a Position in Law
and Economics

Normative economic analysis presupposes a norm. However, the
norms employed in economic analysis need not necessarily coincide
with the moral norms endorsed by a correct philosophical theory. One
may reasonably seek to identify and implement legal practices that
maximize a certain attribute without treating that attribute as an ade13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted [hereinafter Implementing Cost-Benefit], in COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS.
supra note 3. at 269-309; see also Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner. Rethinking Cost-Benefit
Analysis. 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999) [hereinafter Rethinking Cost-Benefit].
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quate philosophical criterion of the value of social arrangements. Thus,
one might pursue a legal system that maximizes a particular attribute
(call it a subgoal) because the subgoal seems to be a good proxy, a
"second best" alternative, for one's real, ultimate norm (call it the
goal). Or it may be best to shoot for the subgoal in practice if either the
goal is difficult to measure directly, or if the goal is more politically
controversial than the subgoal. Or a scholar may choose to present a
model or formal analysis in terms of a subgoal simply because it is easier to understand than an analysis in terms of the goal. Finally, a particular subgoal might be a good proxy for a number of different goals,
so that people with different fundamental beliefs could still agree on the
value of analysis that promotes that subgoal.
Recent law and economics scholarship is conscious of these distinctions. Professors Adler and Posner justify choosing regulations using
the economic technique of cost-benefit analysis on the ground that costbenefit analysis is a "decision procedure" that "says nothing at all [directly] about the moral worth of the project," but tends to promote
morally good principles on the whole.16 Lewis Kornhauser concurs that
"it is inappropriate to consider cost-benefit analysis as a moral criterion;" instead, its moral apologists must "consider how cost-benefit
analysis functions within [a] wider institutional framework" of government action.17 It need not be "justifiable in is~lation."'~
Kaplow and
Shavell, who address normative issues at a more abstract level, claim
that analysis of policies based on their effects on the norm of wealth
can be morally valuable, even though "wealth is not in itself deemed to
be valuable. "Ig
A consistent terminology for these distinctions may be helpful. We
will therefore propose a pair of terms that can be used to keep track of
the different aspects of a legal economist's normative commitments. A
complete proposal to reform the legal system on economic grounds
would answer two questions. First, what substantive ethical or moral
criteria should ultimately be used to evaluate the success or failure of
the legal system? We will call this the moral question. Second, what
type of economic decision procedure should be used in practice to identify legal rules that satisfy the relevant moral criteria? We will call this
the practical question.
Though separable, the two questions are obviously connected. The
analyst cannot answer the practical question-cannot choose a method,
16. Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 194-95.
17. Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS.
supra note 3, at 217.
18. Id. at 218.
19. Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3. at 997.
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a decision procedure-without having some idea of what ultimate criteria the chosen procedure ought to serve. Conversely, a moral goal that
the analyst cannot connect to some sort of implementing procedure in
the real world would be a doubtful guide for legal reform.
A legal analyst could select and defend a variety of moral principles. She might maintain that the legal system should foster efficiency
or equality; fairness, wealth, or individual well-being; piety or revolution. The range of available answers to the moral question, we suppose,
is chiefly constrained by the analyst's moral intuitions and those of the
community.20
An analyst answers the practical question by deciding to use a particular decision procedure (or type of procedure) to pick and choose
between different policies, such as competing legal rules. Notice that
this choice itself involves the adoption of a standard-economic analysis, by its nature, must compare the relative quantities of some attribute
present in different outcomes, so different decision procedures are
characterized in part by the different data they empha~ize.~'
Various
candidates for this attribute include the satisfaction of preferences
measured by willingness to pay as inferred from market transaction^,^^
the satisfaction of preferences revealed in choice-making behavior generally," and perhaps even psychological experiences of pleasure, if
only they could be measured directly.24 The attribute that guides the
decision procedure may be treated as a mere subgoal, a proxy for the
moral good, or it may be treated as a goal. For example, while choosing legal rules that maximize the satisfaction of preferences backed by
willingness to pay might be sought for its own sake (the moral position
20. See RICHARDA. POSNER,ECONOMIC ANALYSISOF LAW 15 (5th ed. 1998) ("[Tlhe
economist [cannot] tell us whether . . . consumer satisfaction should be the dominant value of
MICROECONOM~CS
529 (2d ed. 1990); cf. Kaplow &
society."); HALR. VARIAN,INTERMEDIATE
Shavell, supra note 3, at 986 (acknowledging that "to adopt welfare economics is to adopt the
moral position that one should be concerned, positively and exclusively, with individuals' wellbeing").
21. See Tyler Cowen, What a Non-Paretian Welfare Economics Would Have to Look Like, in
ECONOMICS AND HERMENEUTICS 285. 286 (D. Lavoie ed. 1991). reprinted in ECONOMIC
WELFARE(Tyler Cowen ed. 2000) (noting that welfare economic theory "is concerned with the
ranking of outcomes and must therefore focus upon the maximization of some attribute or set of
attributes"); &IT K. DASGUPTA& D.W. PEARCE, COST-BENEFITANALYSIS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE21 (1972) ("The decision-maker
. is assumed to have an objective function, an
entity which he aims to maximize. This objective function may be profits, or income, or net
social benefits defined in a way so as to incorporate things other than income.").
22. See, e.g., Richard Posner. Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103 (1979); see also Richard Posner. Wealth Marimization Revisited. 2 NOTRE DAMEJ.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85 (1985) (offering a qualified defense of applying the wealthmaximization norm in policy choices).
23. See infra notes 160-193 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 34, 38 (1982) (arguing for reform of penal statutes to promote the norm of maximizing experienced pleasure and minimizing pain).
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of wealth maximization), it might also be sought as a proxy for increasing everyone's well-being.
The above, we said, is a sketch of a complete position. However,
much work in law and economics presents policy conclusions without
giving fully-fledged answers to the moral and practical questions. For
example, A. Mitchell Polinsky's popular primer An Introduction to Law
and Economics presents economic models of legal rules in a simple,
non-algebraic form that measures "all benefits and costs . . . in terms
of a common denominator-dollars."25 Polinsky then trades off these
hypothetical dollar-denominated costs and benefits to determine the rule
that maximizes the amount of net gains to society. He "emphasize[s]
that this assumption [that costs are monetized] is made for expositional
~implicity."'~Thus Polinsky's primer presents a set of models that correspond most naturally to a particular answer to the practical question
(the decision procedure of cost-benefit analysis, discussed at length
below, which measures preferences by implication from market prices),
but Polinsky takes no position on whether cost-benefit analysis is the
best practical approach to choosing legal rules.
Similarly, Polinsky addresses certain problems that may arise when
a policymaker seeks to trade off the goals of efficiency and equity in
the legal sy~tern.'~But the primer does not try to resolve the question
whether a concern for equity is morally required, nor does it suggest
which distributions of income should be regarded as eq~itable.~'
Polinsky refrains from selecting a moral aspiration, except to assert that
efficiency is one value about which decision-makers should care.
Polinsky's primer, with its open-ended approach to moral and practical questions, is a fairly typical academic discussion of normative law
and economics. In particular, the contributions of professional economists to legal policy analysis tend to be incomplete in order to emphasize their generality. These analysts model different legal contexts and
point out mathematical relationships that hold true among the different
costs and benefits involved, regardless of how those costs and benefits
are measured. The aim is to develop insights that are applicable regardless of the moral and practical commitments held by decision-makers.29
25. POLINSKY,
supra note 2, at 10.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 7-10, 119-27 (defining "equityn as an attribute of the distribution of income in
society, and recommending that equitable goals be accomplished through legislative tax and
transfer programs, rather than through the design of legal rules).
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis. 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998); STEVENSHAVELL,ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT
LAW295-96 (1987) (inviting "readers [to] modify the [normative] conclusions reached
here in light of the values they . . . attach to principles of fairness," but expressing no opinion
about whether such modification would be normatively desirable or undesirable). Obviously.
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Incompleteness in defense of generality is often no vice.
But if law and economics is to create benefits through reform, then
somebody must apply economic models to concrete situations. They
must measure, compare, and make a decision. Even if proxies and estimates are used to gauge costs and benefits for the community as a
whole, there is a concrete question whether any given proxy is sufficiently accurate for a particular society at a particular time. Perhaps the
job of concrete economic analysis will not fall to the judiciary. Perhaps
judges should be asked simply to apply statutory legal rules that the
legislature has previously found to be justified on economic grounds.
Nevertheless, this option simply means that the legislature must decide
what the relevant costs are, how to weigh them, and whether a given
legal rule will produce benefits if enacted in a particular state at a particular time. The freedom to adopt agnostic positions is not complete.
Models presented in economic analysis are irrelevant unless it is conceivable that they could be applied, with some accuracy, by relevant
actors like courts, legislatures, or government agencies in practical
situations of policy choice. And conversely, the fact that models can be
implemented is irrelevant unless we believe that their implementation
would promote the principles that decision-makers perceive as important.
2.

Criticism of the Ideal of Completeness

How much completeness, then, is necessary? That is, how much
constraint does the requirement to be both principled and practical impose on law and economics? Cass Sunstein has argued influentially that
common law judging is pervaded with "incompletely theorized agreements" about general principles, on one hand, and about the correct
outcomes of individual cases, on the other.30In Sunstein's view, the use
of incomplete agreements is often indispensable as a matter of political
reality.31 For example, Sunstein suggests that political actors who share
an agreement on a general principle (such as the wrongfulness of racial
discrimination), but differ on its application to particular facts (such as
affirmative action), can still see themselves as holding important things
in common despite painful disagreements about individual outcomes.32
Similarly, the ability of actors, such as appellate judges, to agree on
specific outcomes in particular cases, but not on the large abstract principles that justify them, enables the legal system to resolve disputes
Kaplow and Shavell's Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 3, exhibits no such agnosticism.
30. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING
AND POLITICAL
CONFLICT 35-61 (1996).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 35-36.
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while minimizing political conflict.33
Recently, Sunstein has tried to extend this reasoning to law and
economics. In his view, it may be justified in some cases to use economic decision procedures such as cost-benefit analysis to choose government regulations, despite the lack of a moral consensus on the desirability of the procedure.34 Thus, he argues, "it should be possible for
diverse people to agree on presumptive floors and ceilings [of monetary
costs] for regulatory expenditures," even if those people doubt "that all
questions of regulatory policy should be resolved by asking how much
people are willing to pay for various social goods."35
Sunstein's contentions have merit. However, Sunstein also admits
that the possibility of incomplete agreement has its limits.36 In our
view, there are several reasons that we should hesitate to accept highly
incomplete justifications for legal reforms based on law and economics.
First, Sunstein defends a very open-ended style of decision-making
that he calls "cost-benefit analy~is."~'As he notes, it differs from the
more rigid form of "cost-benefit analysis" that is commonly taughtstandard cost-benefit analysis does resolve policy questions by asking
how much people are willing to pay.38
But to the extent that the procedure used for policy choice is highly
malleable and flexible, it also becomes less distinctive and less of a
guide. If our methods of economic analysis are allowed to become very
loose-textured in order to secure incomplete consensus, there is a danger that law and economics will simply reduce to a rhetoric for carrying
on policy discussions.
On the other hand, suppose we are considering an economic decision procedure that is fairly determinate, setting boundaries as to what
data will be measured and how they will be compared. In that case, we
may be hesitant to accept an incomplete justification because the future
implications of accepting the procedure will be great. Sunstein is convincing when he discusses the value of incomplete agreements in securing consensus on abstract principles of justice, on one hand, and outcomes in particular legal cases, on the other.39 But one can accept a
vague principle without being bound to any particular future application
of it, and one can accept the result in one case without being bound to
33. See id. at 39. 41 (stating that incompletely theorized agreements about outcomes "help
make law possible; they even help make life possible").
34. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS.
supra note 3, at 223, 256.
35. Id. at 256.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See infra discussion Part I.C.1.
39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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the same result in a slightly different case. However, to the extent the
procedure for an economic decision is determinate enough to be useful,
it will presumably leave future outcomes much less open to maneuvering than either of Sunstein's examples. Political actors should therefore
be leery about adopting such procedures without inspecting their moral
credentials.
Finally, Sunstein's notion of incompletely theorized agreement is
most persuasive when applied to a situation in which one group of citizens supports an economic procedure because it has been plausibly justified in terms of moral norm A, which they accept; while another
group rejects moral norm A, but supports the procedure because it has
been plausibly justified in terms of moral norm B, which the second
group accepts. This presumes that some plausible moral arguments are
forthcoming. In a situation where no plausible moral case had been
made for a given procedure, an incompletely theorized agreement that
the procedure is valuable should be much less likely, and perhaps less
admirable.
These considerations suggest that a position with a fair amount of
theoretical "completeness" on the moral and practical levels is still desirable in law and economics. The following parts of this Article consider some of the intellectual resources currently available to theorists
who want to meet that goal. We begin with the moral question.

B. Past and Present Moral Positions in Law and Economics
I.

Wealth Maximization and its Critics

Before the current ferment, legal economists last gave the moral
question serious attention during a period of scholarly debate between
1979 and 1981.40The high-water mark in that debate was the 1980 Hofstra Law Review symposium on EfSiciency as a Legal C~ncern.~'
That
symposium's all-star participants included Guido Calabresi, Richard
Posner, Ronald Dworkin, Duncan Kennedy, and Frank Michelman,
among others.
The Hofstra symposium focused on a thesis that Richard Posner had
first expressed in an article published the previous year.42 Posner argued that "the economic norm [ofJ 'wealth maximization' provides a
--

-

--

-

40. See Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3. at 996 (describing Richard Posner's work from
1979 to 1981 as "the most sustained attempt by a legal scholar to defend a normative law and
economics approach").
L. REV. 485 (1980).
41. Symposium, Eflciency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA
42. Posner, Ufilirarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, supra note 22, at 103; cf. id. at
111 (summarizing claim that "the economic approach is less 'rejectable' than utilitarianism or
Kantianism").
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firmer basis for a normative theory of law than does utilitarianism" or
autonomy-based ethical theories (which Posner termed "Kantiani~m").~~
He attempted to provide a principled ethical argument for wealth
maximization; he was not simply arguing that wealth-maximizing procedures were proxies for a separate moral end.
Posner's argument had two prongs. First, he argued that "wealth
maximization, especially in the common law setting, derives support
from [a] principle of consent that can also be regarded as underlying
the . . . quite different approach of Pareto ethics."44 Posner's consent
argument drew on the notion of "ex ante compensation," which still
enjoys some currency among welfare economists. Posner reasoned that,
while individual outcomes of policy choices that maximized wealth
alone could be viewed as unacceptable to the losers, the outcomes
would still be worthy of hypothetical consent if the individual could
expect to enjoy net benefits from a series of such choices.45 In the long
run, if he would expect to "win" at least as much as he would "lose"
from choices under such a criterion, then the criterion could be treated
as enjoying unanimous (hypothetical) consent.46 Posner compared the
hypothetical consent that he thought legitimated applying the wealth
maximization norm to society to the consent (to a risk of losing) that a
purchaser of a lottery ticket gives by choosing to make that p~rchase.~'
At the same time, Posner argued that wealth maximization avoided
the more extreme or "fanatical" implications that would follow from
basing the legal system on a purely consent-based, "Kantian" substantive norm.48 Because wealth maximization "assign[s] substantial weight
to preferences," it was said to resemble utilitarianism in connecting
ethical worth to the production of human happiness.49 But by counting
preferences only to the extent that they were registered (or could be
registered) in voluntary transactions, wealth maximization also avoided
some of the unattractive implications of theoretical utilitariani~rn.~~
Professors Ronald Dworkin and Jules Coleman trenchantly criticized Posner's ethical arguments for wealth maximization in their contributions to the Hofstra symp~sium.~'
Dworkin's critique of the wealth
43. Id.
44. Richard Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Eficiency Norm in Conunon Law
Adjudication. 8 HoFsTRA L. REV.487. 488 (1980).
45. Id. at 491-92.
46. Id. at 492-93 & n.15.
47. Id. at 492.
48. Id. at 491-97.
49. Posner, supra note 44.
50. See id. at 497 (describing wealth maximization as "constrained utilitarianism," but as
involving a constraint that "is not ad hoc but is supplied by the principle of consent," whose
purpose is to "minimize coercion").
51. Eficiency as a Legal Concern. supra note 41.
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norm was also developed in the contemporaneous article Is Wealth a
Value?52
Dworkin rejected both what he called the "immodest version" of
Posner's normative thesis (the claim that increasing wealth should be
the exclusive criterion of ethical value), and its "modest version" (the
claim that increasing wealth was one component of ethical value).53
Dworkin focused attention on the hypothetical example of a simple,
involuntary transfer of a good from one individual, A, to another individual, B, whose willingness to pay for that good, measured in dollars,
is somewhat greater than A's. Dworkin's point was that such a transaction, once it is analytically stripped of all non-wealth-related ethical
characteristics (such as consent between the parties, or a net increase in
personal happiness), is ethically inert-"no gain at
A wealth
gain, considered strictly as such, is simply irrelevant to any ethical criterion worth valuing. Dworkin suggested that whatever intuitive plausibility the wealth maximization norm enjoyed was derived from the fact
that wealth-maximizing transfers are sometimes correlated with increases in personal happiness or ~ e l l - b e i n g .The
~ ~ impulse underlying
the wealth norm was a half-glimpsed utilitarianism.
Dworkin reached a similar conclusion in his Hofstra symposium
piece, which focused on Posner's consent-based argument for wealth
m a ~ i m i z a t i o nFirst,
. ~ ~ Dworkin argued that the only type of consent that
could be invoked to justify the wealth norm was hypothetical, or "counterfactual" consent.57 But because such counterfactual consent was not
actual consent, Dworkin stressed, it was "itself irrelevant to political
ju~tification."~~
Since legal rules help to fix entitlements, the adoption
of a new rule frequently shifts wealth from some persons to others.
Thus, in a typical situation of policy choice between different legal
rules, many of the affected individuals would reasonably conclude that
they will be losers from the adoption of a particular legal rule, and not
just in the Short term, but consistently so.'' Actual consent to a given
rule will typically not be forthcoming from a fraction of the population-perhaps from a majority. Dworkin's point was simply that one
cannot justify a principle or procedure on the grounds that it is the
Ronald M. Dworkin. Is Wealth a Value?. 9 J . LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id. at 200.
Ronald Dworkin. Why Eficiency? A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8
HOFSTRA
L. REV. 563 (1980).
57. Id. at 574-75.
58. Id. at 575.
59. Consider oligopolists faced with a proposed strengthening of the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act, or polluters faced with a proposed lowering of the legal standard of proof needed
to establish that their polluting activities are enjoinable nuisances.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
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product of free choice, if the principle is not, in fact, chosea6' He concluded that "Posner's appeal to autonomy . . . is wholly spuri~us."~'
Furthermore, Dworkin continued, to the extent Posner suggested
that the losers from a wealth-maximizing rule should be viewed as consenting to the rule, he could only support that claim on the grounds that
the net social gains from such rules would outweigh social losses.62 In
short, analysis of "consent" justifications for wealth maximization left
one in the same place as did considering the wealth norm on its own
merits. What Posner offered was "not an improved version of a Rawlsian argument, but a utilitarian argument only. "63
What was the upshot of the 1979-1981 debate over first principles?
In hindsight, it appears that the foundational position presented by Posner was significantly discredited. After 1980, it was increasingly difficult to defend wealth maximization as an answer to the moral questi~n.~~
Within a few years of the 1980 exchange, Judge Posner himself began to describe his allegiance to the wealth maximization norm in increasingly instrumental terms. By the time his 1985 essay Wealth
Maximization Revisited was published, Posner had reached a revised
p~sition.~'Posner acknowledged that he was "slightly more sympathetic" than he had previously been to criticisms of wealth maximization as an ethical prin~iple.'~
He also acknowledged that it was "not a
demonstrably or a universally correct ethic. Indeed, he devoted part
of his essay to discussing "the instrumental character of wealth maximization. "68 There, he explicitly linked the appeal of wealth maximizaDworkin, supra note 56,at 574-79.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id. at 579. Jules Coleman's essay for the Hofstra symposium presented similar arguments against the principled use of wealth maximization. See Jules Coleman, Elficiency. Utility,
and Wealth Marimization. 8 HOFSTRAL. REV.509, 521-23 (1980). Coleman argued, first, that
compensation (whether ex post or ex ante, in the form of risk discounting) is not equivalent to
consent, and that "knowledge of a risk does not always amount to either explicit or implicit
waiver of a right or . . . an assumption of risk." Id. at 536-37$1.45. Moreover, Coleman argued.
Posner could not provide persuasive grounds to believe that economically rational individuals
under uncertainty would choose to pursue wealth-maximizing institutions and legal rules with
anything like the degree of unanimity required to give such 'hypothetical consent' legitimacy. Id.
at 539-40.
64. See, e.g.. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3; Lewis Kornhauser, On Justifying CostBenefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS,supra note 3, at 201, 217 n.41 (discussing "Richard Posner's proposal in the late seventies that common-law judges ought to maximize wealth."
. attempted to
which "in effect proposed a cost-benefit criterion for judicial decision and
justify [it] . . . on general moral grounds," and concluding that Posner's attempted "justification
largely failed").
65. Posner, Wealth Marimization Revisited, supra note 22.
66. Id. at 85.
67. Id. at 90.
68. Id. at 95-100.

60.
61.
62.
63.

..
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tion to its instrumental tendency to produce happiness:
It is curious, but true, that to aim directly at maximizing happiness [through redistribution] . . . is self-defeating because it results in a poor and unhappy society. Wealth maximization is a
more effective instrument for attaining the goals of utilitarianism than utilitarianism itself. Stated otherwise, wealth maximization is the correct rule of decision in a system of rule utilitariani~m.~~
Thus, Posner's position since the mid-1980s on the normative questions has not been sharply different from a "liberal" position such as
that found in the early works of Guido Calabresi. Both Posner and the
"early Calabresi" held that cost-benefit analysis of legal rules has instrumental value (i.e., it is a decent answer to the practical question),
and that principles such as autonomy and fairness can also come into
play, functioning as a sort of a d hoc veto on the results of cost-benefit
analysis that can be used to align those results more closely with moral
riter ria.^' Works like Economic Analysis of law7' and The Costs of Accidents* thus differ not in their basic moral and practical orientations,
but in the details of their conclusions about the economic effects of particular legal rules, and their intuitions about how frequently moral or
ethical concerns should trump the results of cost-benefit analysis.
Today Posner describes his moral position as corresponding to "the
kind of vague utilitarianism, or 'soft core' classical liberalism, that one
associates with John Stuart
Posner's utilitarianism is qualified
by concessions to individual liberty in cases where strict utilitarian or
other consequentialist reasoning would produce what Posner views as
repugnant conclusions.74
Posner's sustained attention to philosophical foundations (and the
absence thereof) has been the exception. Scholarship in law and economics after 1980 typically did not devote much energy to investigating
moral foundations. There remained a wide scope for arguments that
using cost-benefit analysis to choose legal practices was instrumentally
related to maximizing individual utility, or promoting autonomy, or
69. Id. at 98. Posner also argued that wealth maximization tended instrumentally to promote
norms of autonomy that he assumed were a component of ethical value. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited. supra note 22. at 99-102.
THE
70. Compare POSNER, supra note 20, at 13-15, 238, 284-287, with GUIDO CALABRESI,
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 291 (1970) ("None of my criticisms of the fault system, based as they are
on its failure to reduce accident costs adequately, would be decisive if the fault system found
substantial support in our notions of justice.").
71. RICHARDA. POSNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW(5th ed. 1998).
THE COSTOF ACCIDENTS
(1970).
72. GUIDO CALABRESI.
73. RICHARD POSNER, T H E PROBLEMATICS
OF MORALAND LEGAL
THEORY
xii (1999).
74. See POSNER. supra note 20.
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whatever other norms were deemed to constitute a satisfactory answer
to the moral question. But there were few attempts to justify law and
economics in a rigorous way at its moral source.
That is changing. In recent years, authors have become more conscious of the moral and practical questions, and of the need for arguments to connect them. They present foundational moral principles that
economic procedures are supposed to serve, and they give arguments
defending their chosen principles over alternatives. All of the recent
authors agree that a crucial moral criterion for analyzing legal policies
is individual ~ e l l - b e i n g But
. ~ ~ they propose differing conceptions of
well-being. Kaplow and Shavell, whose approach we will describe as
"comprehensive," believe that the moral goal of well-being reduces
simply to giving people (as a whole) what they actually prefer. Other
authors, whose approach we will describe as "restricted," think that the
content of well-being is more circumscribed: some kinds of preferences
that people hold should not be allowed to influence our conception of a
good legal system.
2.

Well-Being: A Comprehensive Approach

The legal system envisioned by Fairness Versus Welfare, based exclusively on well-being, will undoubtedly be one of the most widely
discussed of the new foundational arguments. Indeed, Kaplow and
Shavell's article is arguably the most extensive presentation of a principled moral position that the law and economics tradition has ever offered. The broad outlines of their position are clear: "[Llegal rules
should be selected entirely with respect to their effects [on human welfare, which is to say] on the well-being of individuals in society."76
Decision-makers should not give any independent weight to "notions of
fairness" such as retributive justice, individual liberty rights, or the
view that keeping promises is intrinsically good; those values "are not
based exclusively . . . on how legal policies affect individuals' wellbeingmn In short, their answer to the moral question is that the legal
system should take its moral direction entirely from what "economists
refer to as welfare economics. "78
Kaplow and Shavell expressly agree with the chief point of the post1980 consensus-that wealth maximization is not a satisfactory answer
-

-

p
-

- -

75. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3; see also Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note
15; Implementing Cost-Benefit, supra note 15 (articulating implications of their earlier work);
Howard Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle,
110 YALEL.J. 173 (2000).
76. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 967.
77. Id. at 1000.
78. Id. at 968.
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to the moral question.79The two authors reject wealth as an "appropriate social goal," noting that "wealth is not defined in terms of individuals' well-being."'' They assert that a moral answer must consider the
distribution of income while defining well-being, which wealth maximization does not do."
The most distinctive aspect of Kaplow and Shavell's moral position
is its commitment to utilitarianism based on unrestricted preferences.
As they define it, welfare is founded upon the notion of individual preferences: "[Tlhe primitive element for analysis of an individual's wellbeing is that individual's ordering of possible outcome^."^^ Outcomes
are placed in a numerical order that reflects whether "one outcome is
preferred to another. "83 Kaplow and Shavell adopt a generally inclusive
attitude toward preferences, but hesitate to accept preferences that are
difficult to measure by standard methods, or seem to diverge from the
welfare implications of the rest of the preference-holder's preference^.^^
The authors state that "[tlhe notion of well-being used in welfare economics is comprehensive in nature. It incorporates in a positive way
everything that an individual might value," including goods, services,
social realities, principles, feelings, and more." They refuse to exclude
any classes of preference from the definition of well-being because of
objections to the content of those preference^.'^ Instead, "[ulnder a welfare economic analysis, any actual preference is given weight because it
reflects an individual's actual well-being."87 In particular, Kaplow and
Shavell refuse to exclude classes of preferences such as "otherregarding" preferences or malevolent preferences." They note that to
draw distinctions between good and bad preferences implies that it is
proper to apply criteria that go beyond the satisfaction of actually held
preference^.'^ Kaplow and Shavell's rejection of the use of independent
notions of fairness also implies rejecting the validity of such criteria."
79. See supra notes 40-72and accompanying text.
80. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 997.
81. See id. at 989-92.
82. Id. at 979 n.33.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1339-50(discussing objectionable preferences).
85. Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3. at 980. Indeed, Kaplow and Shavell stress that "[tlhe
only limit on what is included in well-being is to be found in the minds of individuals themselves. not in the minds of analysts." Id.
86. See id. at 1346.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 1339-43(discussing malevolent preferences); Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3.
at 1343-46(discussing other-regarding preferences); id. at 1346 (concluding that "there is no a
priori basis under welfare economics for ignoring certain preferences").
89. See id. at 1340.
90. Id. ("[Sluch an approach is troubling . . . because the moral force and appeal of welfare
economics lies in promoting the actual well-being of people, not in advancing some hypothetical
notion of satisfaction that is distinct from that of the individuals who are the object of our con-
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The wide sweep of Kaplow and Shavell's acceptance of preferences,
regardless of their content, is exemplified in their treatment of "tastes
for fairness." The authors stress that if "individuals have tastes for legal rules that comport with some personally held notions of fairness,"
then such preferences will be taken into account in the welfare calculus,
in proportion to their strength, just like any other preference^.^' This
concession is important. The studies that we will detail in Part I1 are
probative of preferences about the legal system that are similar to the
"tastes for fairness" considered by Kaplow and Shavell. We will suggest that Kaplow and Shavell's commitment to respect tastes for fairness must extend to the tastes about the legal system that we will describe.
3.

Well-Being: Restricted Views

a. Matthew Adler and Eric Posner
In recent works, Matthew Adler and Eric Posner have presented an
unusually full philosophical defense of using the procedure of costbenefit analysis to choose between competing government regulation^.'^
They begin by noting that previous economic literature has not provided
a firm moral foundation for the cost-benefit procedure.93 They argue
that the application of cost-benefit analysis by agencies can be justified
in terms of "a [moral] criterion with an impressive philosophical pedigree: overall well-being."94
Adler and Posner acknowledge that the traditional welfare economic
view of well-being, which equates well-being to the satisfaction of preferences, reflects an important truth about well-being.95Well-being, they
agree, must be in part a reflection of individual choice and desire.% But
unlike Kaplow and Shavell, Adler and Posner adopt a "restricteddesire-based theory" of well-being: they argue that not all preferences

cern.").
91. Id. at 1350.
92. Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15; see also Implementing Cost-Benefit, supra note
15 (providing another articulation of the theory). The different forms of cost-benefit analysis are
discussed infra at notes 114-120, 144-155 and the accompanying text.
93. See Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 167 ("The reputation of cost-benefit
analysis . . among American academics has never been as poor as it is today . Many law
professors, economists, and philosophers believe that [cost-benefit analysis] does not produce
morally relevant information and should not be used in project evaluation.").
94. Id. at 195. Adler and Posner do not regard well-being as the only moral criterion relative
to policy analysis, but they regard it as "morally relevant" to a significant number of policy
decisions. See id. at 194-95.
95. Id. at 199.
96. See id. at 200.

.
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have the quality that satisfying them increases the holder's well-being.m
In particular, Adler and Posner are inclined to exclude "disinterested or
morally motivated preferences" from the notion of well-being." They
argue that the moral force of the project of promoting individual wellbeing is reduced if "well-being" includes desires for choices and events
that individuals do not regard as an improvement in their own situation,
but feel compelled to favor for other reasons, such as moral reasons.''
b.

Howard Chang

In the course of a recent scholarly exchange with Kaplow and Shavell, Howard Chang has presented philosophical arguments for basing
the analysis of law on a "liberal theory of social welfare."100 Thus,
Chang's work also tackles the moral question. He sketches a particular
theory of social welfare, but unlike Adler and Posner, he does not explore the practical question by linking his favored theory with an economic decision procedure that would best implement it.'''
Chang rejects a moral position that identifies well-being with the
satisfactions of whatever preferences individuals happen to hold. Instead, he believes that a sound moral position should exclude "external
preferencesw-preferences which do not have to do with an individual's
own enjoyment of goods or entitlements, but instead have to do with
"the assignment of goods and opportunities to others."lm In Chang's
view (following the philosophy of Ronald Dworkin), external preferences should be excluded from the moral goal because they "deny the
equal concern and respect that utilitarianism owes all individual^."^'^
For example, Chang accepts Dworkin's argument that an individual's
preference that one racial group receive better treatment than another
should be excluded from the measurement of well-being.lo4 The intuition behind this view is that it is incompatible with the moral principle
of equal regard for individuals to allow one citizen's prejudiced preferences about the fortunes of another citizen to influence the state's pol-

97. Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 202.
98. See Implementing Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 276.
99. See Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 199-200 ("The standard economic theory
[of well-being] is wrong . . . because [an individual] might prefer the project to the status quo
for all manner of reasons, including but not limited to her welfare.").
100. Chang. supra note 75. But see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell. Notions of Fairness
Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency. 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000)
(responding to Chang's arguments); but cf. Howard F . Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian,
110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) (offering a rejoinder to Kaplow and Shavell).
101. See Chang. supra note 75. at 177-78.
102. Id. at 183 (quoting RONALDDWORKIN,
TAKING
RIGHTSSERIOUSLY
234 (1977)).
103. Id. at 185.
104. See id. at 183-84.

356

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 53:2:335

icy toward that second citizen.''' Yet an unrestricted-preference policy
requires that conclusion. Thus, Chang's moral position, like that of
Adler and Posner, holds that the field of preferences taken into account
by welfare economics must be restricted on ethical g r ~ u n d s . " ~
At the same time, the "external" preferences Chang would exclude
from well-being are not coextensive with the "moral" and "disinterested" preferences Adler and Posner are inclined to exclude. Not all
moral or disinterested preferences are external. As Chang notes, individuals who "prefer for moral reasons not to encounter pornography"
in their daily lives offer a good example of a preference that is both
moral and, in a relevant sense, personal.''' Their preferences can be
understood in a way that does not explicitly refer to the opportunities
and lives of ~thers.''~Chang would count these preferences; Adler and
Posner probably would not. And not all external preferences are moral:
as Chang notes, some people might prefer to see their family or ethnic
group receive special treatment due to simple feelings of sympathy and
familiarity, not because they hold a moral or political view that informs
that preference. log Chang would not count these preferences; Adler and
Posner probably would. (It would, though, be a difficult question to
decide whether such a preference is "disinterested" for Adler and Posner's purposes.)
These competing moral conceptions of well-being clearly differ in
important ways. However, their true implications for the legal system
turn on what procedures are available to implement them in practice.
We now turn to that topic.

C. Past Approaches to the Practical Question in Law and Economics
While the debate from 1979 to 1981 revealed gaps in the moral justification of law and economics, it had little impact on routine scholarly
activity. The more theoretical scholars continued to favor "incomplete"
analyses that assumed the existence of a valid measure of social welfare, and largely assumed away the task of how to assign welfare values
in practice."' To the extent it was necessary to decide how to assign
welfare values in practice, other scholars used tests based on maximiz105. See id. at 195 (claiming that a social-welfare theory laundered of objectionable external
preferences would "resistu corruption by illiberal preferences and remain[] faithful to the motivating ideals that give this philosophy [welfarism] much of its appeal").
106. Chang, supra note 75, at 194.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 188.
110. See supra Part I.A.l (discussing the previous work of Kaplow, Polinsky, Shavell. and
others).
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ing social wealth, measured by how much individuals are willing to pay
for things."' This is the same procedure whose application to law was
pioneered by Richard Posner. As we shall discuss below, it is closely
related to the procedure of cost-benefit analysis, as taught in basic
courses in welfare economics. (Following Matthew Adler and Eric Posner's terminology, we will call this textbook cost-benefit analysi~."~)
The situation today is different. Even sympathetic scholars are paying sustained attention to the limitations of textbook cost-benefit analysis. They admit the necessity of developing methods of economic
evaluation that do a better job of measuring individual well-being, thus
creating a closer link between practical procedures and moral principles. But even these efforts usually take textbook cost-benefit analysis
as their starting point, proposing various refinements to its framework.
We therefore describe textbook analysis briefly here before looking at
the recent attempts to refine it.

I.

Textbook Cost-Benefit Analysis

Textbook cost-benefit analysis is "a way of evaluating policy programs by comparing their dollar costs against the market value of the
benefits they provide."l13 In economic jargon, it employs a standard of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as measured by willingness to pay. We sumrnarize the steps below.

a.

The Concept of Willingness to Pay

Textbook cost-benefit analysis measures losses and gains in proportion to the dollar values that the affected individuals would, or do,
place on them. An individual who would pay $500 for clean water is
taken to have a stronger preference for clean water than one who would
pay only $300 for the same good. In practice, the analyst typically in:
fers the relevant dollar values from observing the prices actually paid
by individuals in market transactions for the goods affected by a policy
change or goods related to them. If there is no market for a particular
good that will be created or denied by a given policy, then the cost111. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Eficient Regulation, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 741, 762 (1988) (proposing the repeal of rent control statutes on the basis of
wealth-based analysis; acknowledging the gap between wealth and individual utility, but asserting
that "[tlhe advantage of the wealth test is that it offers a very good proxy for subjective utility,
which is not subject to strategic misrepresentation common with subjective demands not backed
with dollars.").
112. See Implementing Cost-Benefir, supra note 15, at 280 (defining "textbook CBA" as "the
sum of unweighted [compensating variations] based upon actual preferences").
113. Herbert Hovenkamp. Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice. 57 U . CHI.L. REV.
63, 67 (1990).
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benefit analyst "infers (as best he can)" the market price that "would be
expressed if there was a competitive market price."l14 One method for
doing so is to attempt to identify market goods related to the nonmarket good the analyst seeks to value, and then to extrapolate a price
for the non-market good. Another possible method is to poll respondents about how much they would be willing to pay for a particular
entitlement, if it were possible to buy it. All of these examples reveal
that "market prices . . . play a central part in the valuation of benefits"
in textbook cost-benefit analysi~."~
Kaplow and Shavell recognize that
most commentators have regarded cost-benefit analysis as the primary
economic method for comparing legal rules.l16
b.

The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion

The textbook cost-benefit analyst must make a decision after measuring the gains and losses from a policy. This decision, which evaluates
the "goodness" of the proposed change, is performed through another
jargon-laden test: Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. One applies the KaldorHicks efficiency criterion by asking whether the winners from a possible policy change could compensate the losers from the change enough
so that the losers would be indifferent between the status quo, on one
hand, and the world of the new policy plus the compensation, on the
other, while leaving the winners enough benefits left over that they still
prefer their new (winning) status.'17
As previously discussed, the use of cost-benefit analysis leads to
choosing the policy option that the affected individuals would support
with the largest net willingness to pay-in effect, the option with the
highest dollar value. The monetary value of the benefits to the winners
114. DASGUPTA
& PEARCE,supra note 21, at 38.
115. Id. at 38-39.
116. Kaplow and Shavell write that "[mlany legal academics seem to be under the impression
that wealth maximization is the economic measure of social welfare." Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 3, at 995. Using the criterion of wealth maximization to make policy choices is practically
equivalent to making them by appl :ng the textbook form of cost-benefit analysis. Cf. id. at 99596 & nn.67-69; see also infra Pat 1.D.2.b.
As Kaplow and Shavell note, wealth maximization means "maximizing the total dollar value
of, or willingness to pay for, social resources." Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 995. Textbook cost-benefit analysis does the same thing. It identifies the amount of money that the individual would be willing and able to pay in order to get that option-in other words, its dollar
value. It identifies the "cost" of a given option, in turn, with the amount in dollars that the individual would be willing and able to pay in order to get the competing policy options that he
cannot get if the first option is chosen. See DASGUPTA
& PEARCE, supra note 21, at 40. 47. In
this way, textbook cost-benefit analysis simply selects the policy option that is supported by the
largest (numerical) willingness to pay (i.e., backed by the most dollars). It is therefore equivalent
to wealth maximization as defined by Posner.
117. See Hovenkamp, supra note 113, at 64-67; Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at
190-91.
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from such an option will exceed the monetary value of the costs to
those who lose from such an option. It follows that the winners from
any policy that is chosen by cost-benefit analysis could fully compensate the losers and still have some surplus left-which is simply to say
that any such policy satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.'18
The great convenience of textbook cost-benefit analysis is that it
purports to make it possible to compare how much well-being different
individuals receive from the same policy by (as it were) simply adding
and subtracting. Market prices provide the toehold that enables economic formalism to be applied in practice. Market prices are concretely
measurable in the real world, and they provide a handy numerical
measure of the relative strengths of different individuals' preferences,
making tradeoffs possible.
Yet the simplicity of the textbook cost-benefit analysis procedure is
offset by serious weaknesses. Note that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion used
in textbook cost-benefit analysis evaluates whether the losers from a
policy could be fully compensated by the winners. Actual compensation
is not required and is not normally expected, although it could be paid
in theory from general tax revenues. As many critics have pointed out,
this fact makes the moral relevance of textbook cost-benefit analysis
very debatable. 'Ig
Most crucially, weighing preferences for policies according to
money means that the preferences of the rich count more. The effect of
Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis is to give entitlements (e.g., the
right to be protected by a legal rule) to the parties who would be willing to pay more (in dollars) for them. The measures of preference
strength in this procedure are therefore subject to being distorted by
what economists call "wealth effects;" a poor person might desire a
good more than his wealthy friend, but cost-benefit analysis will give
the good to the rich person because she will be willing to pay more for
it.'''
2.

Challenging the Consensus: Behavioral Research

Beginning in the late 1980s, a forceful critique called into question
118. See Rethinking Cost-Benefit. supra note 15, at 190-91.
119. See, e.g., Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 190 ("Most economists appear to
concede that the Kaldor-Hicks standard is not, by itself, normatively desirable."). The moral
criticisms of Richard Posner's wealth maximization norm in Part I.B.l also function as criticisms
of the direct moral relevance of textbook cost-benefit analysis. Wealth maximization is essentially the moral view that a properly performed textbook cost-benefit analysis of a given policy
omits no morally relevant information about that policy. Hence there is no need for intricate
arguments to connect the cost-benefit analysis procedure to that moral norm, as (for example)
Adler and Eric Posner must do as a result of their moral and practical positions.
120. See POSNER. supra note 20. at 13.
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the working assumptions that underlie the "Posnerian consensus"
among mainstream legal economists on the value of cost-benefit analysis. This consensus assumes that there is a reliable instrumental connection between the procedure of cost-benefit and moral values that decision-makers care about, and that there is little need for explicit argument to substantiate the assumed connection or to identify the relevant
moral values. Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Ellickson and others argued
that there is little evidence that applying the techniques of textbook
cost-benefit analysis to people's behavior will yield utility-maximizing
legal rules. lZ1
In this section, we examine the modern data that confirms this observation. This field of research, called behavioral psychology (or just
behavioralism), documents traits of individuals' actual choice-making
behavior that do not easily conform to the rational-actor model that is
utilized by neoclassical economic^.'^^ In fact, behavioralism frequently
identifies ways in which people's actual behavior can diverge systematically from the predictions of the old rational-actor model.'" This raises
the possibility of incorporating these predictable, though apparently
irrational, behavioral choices into newer, more adequate models of the
effects of different legal rules. In turn, analysts can employ these improved models to reach new conclusions about the legal system.'"
The classical rational-actor mode1 assumes that "a person . . . can
rank possible outcomes in order of expected utility."125Roughly speaking, the model treats a person as if she ranked the different possible
'actions available to her according to how much she desired (or dreaded)
each of the various outcomes that a given action might bring about,
multiplied by how likely she believes each outcome is to occur.lZ6The
121. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV 23 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4, 76 (1994).
122. See Ellickson, supra note 121.
123. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously (I): The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously (11): Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1420 (1999) (presenting evidence that product manufacturers can and do use advertising
and marketing techniques to cause consumers regularly to underestimate the risks of productrelated injuries); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998) (arguing that evidence drawn from human behavioral psychology
suggests that legal rules that have the effect of redistributing wealth among parties distort work
incentives less than income taxes with a similar redistributive effect).
124. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 123 (arguing that behavioral inquiry into the respective incentive-distorting effects of legal rules and taxation raises "a pressing normative issue
.[namely,] is it proper for government to rely on redistributive legal rules [instead of taxes] to
achieve its distributive objectives?").
125. Ellickson. supra note 121. at 23.
126. See Shavell, supra note 29, at 2 nn.2-3 (providing a brief summary of the theory of
expected utility).
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model further assumes that when faced with such a choice, a person
will choose the highest-ranked action-that is, "the course of action that
will maximize his personal expected utility. "I2'
Behavioral research suggests two general ways that individuals' actual choices either violate this model or require the analyst to add complications to it. First is the class of psychological results called cognitive biases. These are persistent "deviations and cognitive illusions"
which lead individuals to make errors in evaluating the outcomes associated with different choices.128For example, individuals are subject to
framing effects: they often make divergent choices when presented with
what are really identical options, presented in a superficially different
manner.I2' People respond differently to a hypothetical option that
would "save" 200 people out of 600 than they do to an option that
would "kill" 400 people out of 600.'~' Yet a rational actor would be
indifferent between the same options.131 As another example, individuals are also persistently subject to confirmation biases.13' They fail to
give weight to new information that challenges their beliefs about the
likely outcomes of actions, because their thinking is irrationally dominated by those data that tend to support the views they already h01d.l~~
Many other examples could be given. Research on cognitive biases has
an important impact on the work of economists and particularly on the
value of cost-benefit analyses. It suggests that the choices individuals
make (say, to purchase a particular good at a particular price) are often
a poor guide to the utility that they receive from the outcomes associated with those c h 0 i ~ e s . Thus,
l ~ ~ to the extent that market prices reflect
irrational cognitive biases rather than rational bargaining, they will be a
poor measure of the strength of individual preferences.I3'
The burgeoning behavioral scholarship on bounded self-interest and
social norms poses a second kind of challenge to the rational-actor
model. The rational-actor model typically predicts that the parties to a
sale, trade, or other transaction will each try to maximize their material
gain from the tran~acti0n.l~~
Scholars typically treat material incentives
as more fundamental than whatever ethical or altruistic motives a per-

127. Ellickson. supra note 121. at 23.
128. See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 123, at 645.
129. Id. at 644-45.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 647-50.
133. See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 123, at 647-50.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697,
1701 (1996).
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son might entertain.I3' For example, the path-breaking analysis of entitlements in Ronald Coase's famous article The P r o b l e n l of Social Cost
is premised on the notion that, if an even slightly advantageous bargain
is available to an individual, he will strike it, and to the extent he can
appropriate the gains from the bargain to himself, he will do so.'38 In
practice, however, it has become clear that individuals will often knowingly refrain from engrossing every penny from a transaction, apparently in order to leave a fair portion of the surplus for the other
party.139Behavioral researchers have described these phenomena as a
tendency to exhibit "bounded self-interest. "I4'
Some economic analysts have sought to bring these observed divergences back within the reach of the rational-actor model by theorizing
that individuals' maximizing behavior is constrained by internalized
social norms of a more or less definite character.l4I A growing body of
literature examines norms, developing theories of how they come to be
and are perpetuated from individual to individual, and attempts to come
up with ways to incorporate them into economic m0de1s.I~~
It is tempting to envision a connection, deep in the doctrinal structure of law and economics, between increased attention to behavioral
research (and thus to the practical question) and the recent increased
interest in providing philosophical defenses of the economic approach.
Perhaps the previous complacency of law and economics scholars about
analyzing the moral foundations of their reform proposals depended
upon the premise that observing "revealed preferences" in the market'place was an uncontroversial way to isolate effects on well-being137. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA.L. REV. 1577, 1577-78 (2000) ("Almost all economists . practice
moral skepticism by exploring efficient institutional arrangements for rationally self-interested
actors.").
138. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
139. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
LAW AND ECONOMICS,
supra note 3, at 13, 21-23 (describLaw and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL
ing the Ultimatum Game).
140. See id. at 16 ("[Wle use the term bounded self-interest to refer to an important fact
about the utility function of most people: They care, or act as if they care, about others, even
strangers, in some circumstances."); see also Ellickson, supra note 121, at 45-48 (discussing.
imposition of cultural norms on the rational-actor model).
141. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 973.
142. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 137, at 1579 (proposing to "extend economics" to "chart
the distribution, effects, and causes of internalized valuesn); see also Posner, supra note 136, at
1697; cf. Ellickson, supra note 121, at 45-48 (alteration in original) (presenting "a suggestive
model of the internalization of culture"). Kaplow and Shavell make their own contribution to this
genre, offering a speculative account of how inculcated social norms with a cultural or biological
origin may account for the (to them spurious) appeal of notions of fairness to legal scholars. See
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1021-24. But see Lawrence Mitchell, Understanding Norms,
49 U . TORONTO
L.J. 177 (1999) (criticizing "the new norms jurisprudes" for adopting an excessively external and positivistic view of social norms that neglects the properly normative, obligatory quality of adherence to norms).
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uncontroversial enough that an explicit defense was largely unneces~ a r y . To
' ~ ~the extent that behavioral research has shown that people's
actual choices often do not conform to the presuppositions of the rational-actor model, it has thrown the underlying assumptions about
well-being into question as well. An independent definition of wellbeing-required by the data-requires a philosophical, and not merely
economic, justification.
Whatever the reasons, it is clear that a new series of answers to
both questions is emerging. Above, we discussed the principle of wellbeing. In the next section, we consider the ferment on the practical
front-the ways scholars have proposed to turn the moral aspiration of
promoting well-being into a practical reality.

D. Contemporary Approaches to the Practical Question
1. Adler and Posner 's Improved

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Adler and Posner's discussion of the practical component of economic analysis is highly sensitive to the distinction between practical
and moral goals. Adler and Posner agree with the critics of textbook
cost-benefit analysis that the economic norm directly implicated in the
procedure-Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-"lacks genuine normative imp ~ r t . " ' " Therefore
~
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) "itself must be recognized to lack normative significance.
Adler and Posner nevertheless
support the use of cost-benefit analysis to choose legal rules in many
circumstances, because, they argue, the procedure has an instrumental
tendency to serve the value of overall well-being, which does have
normative significance:
CBA is a decision procedure. It is a technique used by agencies
for choosing between options, a technique whose justifiability
must be evaluated in light of normative criteria with which CBA
is only contingently connected. . . . [Tlhere is a genuine normative criterion that does plausibly justify the use of CBA, and
that is the criterion of overall well-being.146
While Adler and Posner aim to defend the use of cost-benefit analysis in agency decisionmaking, they do not defend textbook cost-benefit

143. See Herbert Hovenkamp. Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U . CHI.L.
REV. 63, 73 (1990).
144. Implemenring Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 1109.
145. Id. at 1110.
146. Id.
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ana1y~is.l~~
Rather, they shoulder the task of "rethinking" cost-benefit
analysis, and propose refinements that they hope will make it an attractive procedure for agencies to use to maximize well-being.I4' To revert
to our framework, their work attempts to sketch the outlines of a satisfactory practical position.
For our purposes, there are three important differences between
Adler and Posner's 'improved' cost-benefit analysis and textbook costbenefit analysis. First, as we have seen, Adler and Posner argue that an
improved cost-benefit analysis should reflect certain moral limitations:
it should not include all preferences as part of overall well-being.'49 It
should try, to the extent that such precision is justifiable, to exclude the
effects of moral or disinterested preferences from analysis, even if
those preferences are backed by d01lars.l~~
Second, improved cost-benefit analysis "might perhaps be refined
to correct its endowment dependence:" that is, roughly, it might be
refined to correct the problem of wealth effects.I5' Unfortunately, while
Adler and Posner recognize the serious problems that wealth effects
create for cost-benefit analysis, they can offer few solutions to the
problems. They note that the ideal solution would be a method that begins by estimating (valid) preferences that are backed by willingness to
pay, then changes the numerical weight of those preferences "by a factor inversely proportional to the wealth of the person affected," thus
equalizing the weight of the preferences of rich and poor.'52 Only then
would an analyst trade off estimated welfare gains and losses.'53 Unfor.tunately, the development of this sort of weighting procedure has provided an almost mythical ideal for welfare economics, one that is still
unrealized. As Adler and Posner admit, "[w]elfare economists have not
yet, in fact, been successful in producing" any such weighting proced ~ r e . Third,
' ~ ~ in light of economists' inability to correct reliably for
wealth effects, Adler and Posner conclude that improved cost-benefit
analysis "must be confined to choice situations where endowment dependence does not cause too great a degree of inac~uracy."'~~
An appraisal of Adler and Posner's recommendation for using improved cost-benefit analysis to make policy choices must also take note
of the fact that the authors are only concerned to promote "[tlhe use of
Id.
See Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15.
See id. at 202.
See id.
Id. at 224 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
See Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 224.
Id.
Id.
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CBA by [administrative] agencies,"156not by legislators, common-law
judges or juries. The practical problems that we detail later in this Article seem likely to be particularly acute in the common-law context.
Thus, they are less likely to apply to Adler and Posner's position than
they are to the positions of Kaplow and Shavell and other analysts we
discuss. Nevertheless, as the discussion in preceding sections has
shown, many academics do not share Adler and Posner's apparent hesitation to intrude economic norms into the analysis and reform of the
common law. As a careful and sophisticated attempt to refine costbenefit analysis and to make it a valid practical procedure, Adler and
Posner's work is relevant beyond the agency context. As we have also
suggested, it is also still characterized by a number of problems.
2.

Professors Kaplow and Shavell

Kaplow and Shavell do not commit themselves to a particular position on how analysts should aggregate the satisfaction of individual
preferences to calculate the total welfare effects of a poli~y.'~'Their
article represents a call for analysts to apply preference-based methods
of decision-making to the exclusion of fairness concepts.'58 It does not,
however, offer a single-best approach to the problems of trading off
preferences in making policy decision^.'^^ In our terms, Kaplow and
Shavell's answer to the moral question is clearer than their answer to
the practical one.
Nevertheless, the concept of preference is not self-defining. And in
the course of describing the welfare economic framework, and in responding to anticipated objections, Kaplow and Shavell gradually reveal
a practical position that is distinctive in its treatment of different possible preferences. We detail here some of the important aspects of that
position.

156. Id. at 168.
157. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 988.
158. See id. at 1315. Kaplow and Shavell state:

[Wlith regard to our primary audience of legal academics and other serious analysts of legal rules. the question is how best to conduct this enterprise over time,
which is to say, how to design a research agenda. Such an agenda includes preliminary fact gathering and analysis, followed by an ongoing process of refinement and
reformulation of hypotheses combined with empirical tests. The process exploits a
well-recognized and important synergy between theoretical and empirical work. .
In this setting, it is clear that the overall research program should be formulated
by direct reference to . . the advancement of individuals' well-being.

.

.

.

Id.
159. Id. at 988 (emphasis in original) ("[Llegal policy analysis should be guided by some
coherent way of aggregating individuals' well-being.").
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a. Attitude Toward Orthodox Paretianism
A notable feature of Kaplow and Shavell's position is their sympathy toward introducing into the normative analysis of law economic
methods that go beyond the neoclassical analysis often presented as
"welfare economics" in textbook^.'^^ Traditional welfare economics
gauges changes in individual utility by looking to revealed preferences
(i.e., preferences expressed in individuals' observable choice-making
behavior). The analyst does not look "behind" individuals' choicemaking behavior to impose an objective value on utility changes.I6'
Moreover, utility is assumed to be ordinal, not cardinal; direct interpersonal comparisons of utility are not permitted.16*
Similarly, economists traditionally have not treated "preferences"
as complex psychological entities. Instead, they have defined them in
external terms, as a simple function of individuals' acts of choice.163
This immensely simplifies the empirical problem of gathering data on
the utility that individuals receive from particular 0pti0ns.l~~
If individual Dori, upon being offered a choice of two alternatives E or F
chooses F, then option F is deemed, as a matter of definition, to give
Dori greater utility than option E did. The economist will assign a
higher numerical utility value to F than to E in Dori's "individual utility function." An individual's utility function is the ordering of all of
her (relevant) preferences in numerical order, according to the utility
numbers that have been assigned to different outcomes in light of the
.individual's choice-making behavior. As long as each numbered outcome is preferred by the individual in question to all lower-numbered
outcomes and no higher-numbered outcomes, the particular numbers
assigned to each outcome are arbitrary, a matter of convenience for the
economist. This is what is meant when economic measures of utility are
described as "ordinal." The neoclassical approach continues to define
160. See Tyler Cowen, Introduction to ECONOMIC WELFARE xiii (Tyler Cowen ed.. 2000)
(observing that "[mlost economists pay lip service to . . . [traditional] Paretianism, and teach it
to their classesn but use cost-benefit analysis to evaluate policies in practice); Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 3, at 998-99 (suggesting that their presentation may appear novel because "the [contemporary] welfare economic framework developed by economists has not been adequately presented in legal academic discoursen).
161. See Cowen. supra note 160; see also VARIAN.supra note 20.
162. See Cowen. supra note 160.
163. See generally VARIAN,supra note 20, chs. 4, 7. Varian's leading undergraduate textbook summarizes the neoclassical approach by observing that "the theory of consumer behavior
has been reformulated entirely in terms of consumer preferences, and utility is seen only as a
way to describe preferences . . . ."Id. at 54. The concept of preference, in turn, is only a way
of describing actual choices: "[ilt follows from [the rational-actor] model of consumer behavior
. . that the choices [individuals] make are preferred to the choices that they could have made."
Id. at 119-20.
101. See id.
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orthodox welfare economics, as taught in university courses, to this
day. It is also the approach to which Professors Kaplow and Shavell
give allegiance-some of the time.
Even after the analyst has created all of the necessary individual
welfare functions, the assumptions built into the neoclassical framework
sometimes make it difficult to reach judgments about effects on social
welfare-the total effects on all individuals' utility associated with a
particular policy decision.I6' The main criterion of social welfare employed in neoclassical welfare economics is Pareto
Under
this criterion, Option A is superior (economists use the term 'Paretosuperior') to Option B if no one has lower utility in A than in B and
someone has higher utility in A than B. In the welfare economics paradigm, this means that A is Pareto-superior to B if at least one individual
prefers A to B and no individual prefers B to A.
The Pareto-superiority criterion has two advantages. First, because
it is defined purely in terms of ordinal preference relations, it can be
applied without making interpersonal cardinal utility comparisons. It is
therefore adaptable to the empirical methods of neoclassical economics.
Second, the Pareto-superiority criterion has generally been thought to
embody an uncontroversial set of ethical commitment^.'^^ Intuitively, if
someone would prefer a given social change to be made, and no one
would prefer that it not be made, then we are likely to think that the
change would represent an improvement. However, it has been questioned whether the Pareto criterion contradicts ethical or moral intuitions in some cases.I6'
The chief weakness of the Pareto-superiority criterion is that it cannot be used directly to evaluate sets of policy options when each option
under consideration would cause gains to some individuals and losses to
others. In such a situation, some individuals will prefer the status quo
while others will prefer a change. Thus, no option will be Pareto165. See Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3. at 985-98.
166. See generally id.
167. See CATHERINE M. PRICE. WELFAREECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7 (1977)
("Pareto's analysis maintains near-universal acceptability by avoiding any controversial distributional judgment, though only by ignoring altogether this important facet of welfare.").
168. See Amartya Sen. The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. 78 J . POL. ECON. 152 (1970)
(presenting a formal argument that the Pareto criterion is incompatible in principle with a liberal
morality that would grant to each individual a minimal sphere of activity within which hislher
will is sovereign). Kaplow and Shavell, of course, give the Pareto criterion pride of place in
their normative theory. Their criticism of the principles of fairness emphasizes that giving independent weight to such principles logically entails (under certain other assumptions) that Paretoinferior policy options-ones that every affected person finds less preferable than some other
option-would be selected in some (perhaps purely hypothetical) circumstances. See generally
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Norions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle. 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63 (1999) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell. Conflict]; cf. Kaplow
& Shavell. supra note 3. at 1012-13 n.102 (giving an informal summary of the same argument).
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superior to the others. A huge number of real-world policy choices
have this forrn.l6' In short, Pareto-efficiency analysis cannot generally
determine choices between different possible legal r ~ 1 e s . lThe
~ ~ judgment that one may wish to make in such cases is whether the gains experienced by some, in a given project, outweigh the losses undergone
by others. If a cardinal measure of utility is available, the welfare
economist can suggest a natural way of doing so: sum up utility gains
and losses across all individuals, and select the policy option with the
associated highest net value. But orthodox Paretian analysis rejects cardinal measures of utility and disallows such interpersonal welfare comparisons.
By contrast, Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge that applied policy
analysis cannot be carried out unless ordinalism is supplemented by
some method of making interpersonal utility comparisons: "Implicit in
any social welfare function is a comparison of, and a way of trading
off, different individuals' ~tilities."'~'While Kaplow and Shavell admit
that the tools of welfare economics provide no "uncontroversial, verifiable way" to make such comparisons, they insist, on a somewhat weak
note, that "there do exist coherent approaches to the task."'" Apart
169. See PRICE,supra note 167, at 19.
170. See POSNER, supra note 20, at 14-15 (observing that "the conditions for Pareto superiority are almost never satisfied in the real world," so that "[wlhen an economist says that
some . . . policy or state of the world is efficient, nine times out of ten he means Kaldor-Hicks
efficientn). Kaplow and Shavell agree that the Pareto criterion has little direct application to
particular problems of policy choice, but stress that it "nevertheless has powerful implications
for what criteria for making policy choices one can plausibly employ." Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 3, at 1015 (emphasis in original). Again, this refers to Kaplow's and Shavell's formal argument that non-preference-based modes of evaluation should be rejected because they require one
to approve certain policy changes even though all affected individuals would, in the imagined
(perhaps real) situations, prefer the status quo to the change. See generally Kaplow & Shavell,
Conflict, supra note 168.
171. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 985 n.42.
BARON,MORALITYAND RATIONALCHOICE 144
172. Id. (citing, inter alia. JONATHAN
(1993). and John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 317-20 (1955)). Kaplow and Shavell appear to be
particularly attracted to Harsanyi's intricate work on interpersonal comparisons. Roughly. Harsanyi proposed that utilities could be compared by constructing a matrix, each of whose elements
represents the effect of one competing policy upon one affected person. See Adler & Posner.
supra note 15, at 206-07 (providing a slightly more detailed summary, which our summary
closely tracks, of Harsanyi's proposal). The matrix will have as many elements as the number of
competing policy options being weighed times the number of persons affected by it. Id. Each
element represents a state: being this person subjected to this policy. Id. Then Harsanyi imagines
that an impersonal observer could rank all of the individual states from most desirable to least,
and that this could be used (with further manipulations) as the basis for a comparison of the
overall welfare effects of each outcome on the population as a whole. Id. Despite the ingenuity of
Harsanyi's proposal, the above description should suggest that there are significant difficulties in
using it as a routine tool for comparing policies.
Another, older approach is associated with W. Armstrong, and involves arranging different
outcomes in a scale according to which each one is 'barely preferred' to the ones above it. See
DASGUPTA
& PEARCE,supra note 21, at ch. 1.4 (describing Armstrong's theory). 'Bare preference' is taken as corresponding to a fixed magnitude that is assumed to be the same for each
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from interpersonal comparisons, the authors also acknowledge that the
analyst's choice of a numerical utility scale for each individual is constrained when the individual faces choices whose outcomes exhibit uncertainty.ln In sum, while the preference framework of traditional welfare economics is still central for Kaplow and Shavell, the authors also
envision an extension of more speculative conceptions of individual and
social utility into the mainstream of law and economics, while retaining
the preference framework.

b. Attitude Toward Cost-BeneJTtAnalysis and Wealth
Egects
Considering Kaplow's and Shavell's explicit rejection of wealth
maximization as a moral norm,174one might expect that the authors
would support modifying textbook cost-benefit analysis by adjusting
preference strength to compensate for wealth effects, thus aligning costbenefit analysis more closely with well-being.17' Equally, one might
attempt to gauge preference strength in a wealth-neutral manner by surveying individuals about their preferences and asking them to express
their willingness to pay for certain outcomes or entitlements against a
hypothetical budget that is the same for each person.
However, Kaplow and Shavell appear sympathetic to using simple
wealth in practice as a proxy measure of social welfare. Economic
analysis based on maximizing wealth, they argue, "may in fact reasonably approximate maximization of social welfare in many context~.""~Moreover, they argue that normative models that equate social
individual, and different persons' gains and losses can therefore (in theory) be measured against
an interval scale of utility whose units correspond to the 'bare preference' relation. Id.
173. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 979 n.33. 985 n.42 (noting that when modeling
choice under uncertainty, individual utility indices must obey von Neumann-Morgenstern axi& PEARCE, supra note 21. at 31-32 & n.1 (explaining the von Neuoms); see also DASGUPTA
mann-Morgenstern index).
174. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
175. Cf.Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3. at 992 n.58 (discussing the economic literature on
optimal income taxation which attempts to incorporate a concern for the effects of the distribution of wealth).
176. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 997. Kaplow and Shavell give no particular argument for this confidence that wealth maximizationlorthodox cost-benefit analysis is a good approximation of social welfare; it appears to be a simple intuition about a rather thorny empirical
matter. See also id. at 993 (asserting a belief that "many legal rules probably have little effect on
the distribution of income"). Kaplow and Shavell's belief that cost-benefit analysis of legal rules
may be helpful despite its omission of distributional effects may also derive from their often
expressed view that legislatures are better placed than courts to fix distributional inequality. See
id. at 994 n.65. 995 n.66. However, they offer no empirical support for the proposition that
legislatures ever, in fact, perform Kaldor-Hicks corrections of private law maldistributions.
In our minds, the last word on such arguments, which have enjoyed currency for at least two
decades, belongs to Duncan Kennedy. See Duncan Kennedy. Law-and-Economics from the PerDICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS
AND
spective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALCRAVE
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welfare to "some simple wealth-like aggregate" may be useful for analytical purpose^.'^ In both of these respects, "although wealth is not in
itself deemed to be valuable, analysis that assesses policies based on
their aggregate impact on wealth will often prove useful. "I7* Thus, Kaplow and Shavell are attracted to cost-benefit analysis not only as a theoretical tool, but also as an answer to the practical question.17' At the
same time, they appear willing to entertain other possible decision procedures as long as they are solely defined by their consequences and are
primarily based on the satisfaction of actual preferences.
c.

Preferences: How Are They Identified?

While Kaplow and Shavell reject content-based censorship of preferences, they do suggest that some preferences should be excluded from
welfare calculations because of the circumstances in which they are
elicited. Their qualms extend to several different types of potential
preferences.
i.

Uninformed or Self-Defeating Preferences

Behavioral law and economics challenges the revealed-preference
framework by detailing the ways in which individuals' actual choices
may not effectively promote their own well-being. One of the most important limitations on individuals' ability to maximize their own wellbeing is the difficulty of gathering and adequately processing information in real-life situation^.'^^ In Kaplow and Shavell's framework, this
raises the possibility that an individual (call her Dori) might squarely
choose policy A over policy B, even though Dori's other preferences
suggest that she should prefer B to A. We would know this happened if
a competent economist, drawing on sufficient empirical data about
Dori's other preferences, would construct an individual utility function
THE LAW 465. 469 (Peter Newman ed. 1998) ("Legislatures never, ever pass statutes that adjust
tax and transfer programs to make up for the impact of modifications of private law rules (though
of course they could if they wanted to.").
177. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 997.
178. Id.
179. There is some tension between Kaplow's and Shavell's apparent attraction to cost-benefit
analysis and their emphasis on the novelty and the moral attractiveness of the position they set
out in Fairness Versus Weyare. Kaplow's and Shavell's frequent invocations of "well-being,"
and their attention-getting insistence that allowing decision-makers to employ norms of fairness
risks "mak[ing] everyone worse off," and "stands in opposition to human welfare at the most
basic level," lose some emotive punch if what norms of fairness "stand in opposition to" is a
regime that, judging from the authors' remarks, might frequently involve choosing legal rules by
textbook cost-benefit analysis. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1016. 1017.
180. See Jolls et al., supra note 139, at 14-15 (describing the effects of cognitive limitations
on individuals' ability to respond correctly to incentives); cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at
1332 (noting that "there are limits to the amount of information that any individual can absorb").
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for Dori that assigns a higher utility value to B than to A. Kaplow and
Shavell's response is to trump the preference actually expressed by
Dori, for Dori's own good.Ig1That is, they would require the legal system to provide policy B, and not policy A, as long as B would satisfy
Dori's other preferences to a sufficient degree to outweigh the actual
loss (if any) to her welfare incurred in disregarding her uninformed
choice between the two policies.182
Deciding which policy will maximize Dori's welfare in such a situation is not a straightforwardly empirical matter; it requires an exercise
of judgment on the analyst's part. Once one acknowledges that a preference (or a decision intended to satisfy preferences)lg3 can be "mistaken," the job of distinguishing "true" preferences from "irrational"
or "mistaken" ones is essentially a matter of mutual adjustment of the
data. The welfare economist draws on the available empirical information about individuals' desires (market prices, choice behavior, expressions of opinion, psychological principles, etc.) and postulates a pattern
of underlying preferences that fit the data and imposes a psychological
coherence on it.Ig4To the extent an analyst discovers more and more
data that tend to reflect the influence of a preference or choice that he
has previously treated as "irrational" or "uninformed," he should tend
to regard that preference as increasingly stable, non-anomalous, and
entitled to increased weight in the welfare calculus.
ii. Apparent Preferences That Are a Product of
Framing Effects
In contrast to their limited consideration of uninformed preferences,
Kaplow and Shavell are reluctant to give any weight to "preferences"
that disappear or diminish in intensity when they are elicited by a trivially different stimulus. In particular, they state that opinion research
into tastes for fairness is often of "limited value" due to such framing

181. We assume for purposes of this hypothetical that the choice between policies A and B has
no other welfare effects on third parties. Otherwise, if the welfare gain to others from choosing
policy B might outweigh the benefits to Dori from policy A it might be proper to trump Dori's
preference for A even if it were fully consistent with her other preferences and even if Dori were
really a net gainer from policy A (contra the hypothetical).
182. See Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3, at 1331 ("[Plroper welfare economic analysis takes
these [informational] imperfections into account."); id. at 1332 ( " w h e n individuals' decisionmaking capacity is inherently limited, different legal rules may be appropriate.").
183. As Kaplow and Shavell note, the distinction between an individual who does not know
how something will satisfy his preferences, and an individual who does not know what his preferences are, is merely "a semantic difference" that can be varied to suit the analyst's purposes.
Id. at 1332 n.908.
184. See id. at 986 ("In several different respects, the approach of welfare economics involves value judgments.").
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effects.18' They believe that "preferences" that are products of framing
effects are not preferences at all.
d.

How Should Preferences Be Measured?

Kaplow's and Shavell's treatment of preferences also reveals a concern about the difficulty of gauging the strength of preferences that
cannot be satisfied in market transactions. This concern is in some tension with the authors' emphasis on the ability of welfare economics to
take account of "everything that an individual might value,"186and their
claim that welfare economics differs importantly from wealth maximization. 18'
For example, in the course of discussing the normative implications
of welfare economics for procedural law, Kaplow and Shavell discuss
research by E. Allan Lind, Tom Tyler, and other psychologists suggesting that individuals place significant value on legal procedures that are
perceived as fair.188Kaplow and Shavell criticize Lind and Tyler for not
trying to give a numerical value to individuals' preference for procedural fairness by "simply asking how much, if anything, individuals
would have been willing to pay . . . for greater participation or procedures that in other respects were viewed as fairer."18'
Indeed, Kaplow's and Shavell's concerns about non-market preferences extend to tastes for fairness generally. They observe that:
[I]t may be difficult to measure individuals' tastes with regard
to the fairness of legal rules. There usually do not exist market
transactions that would provide a basis for quantifying individu- '
als' tastes for notions of fairness in the manner that their taste,
say, for apples can be inferred from its market price."'

'

However, the authors note that one can get some insight into the values
of hard-to-value goods by looking to the values of closely related goods
or market goods bundled with the nonmarket good in question. lgl
A moral position as "encompassing" as the one Kaplow and Shavell
185. See id. at 1351 (asserting that the "unreliability of polling information is suggested by
the sensitivity of responses to modest changes in the wording of the questions posed"); see also
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3. at 1351 n.946 (discussing literature on framing effects. and
divergences between willingness to pay for entitlements as expressed in opinion surveys, on one
hand, and as actually observed in life, on the other); see also supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
186. Kaplow & Shavell, supra, note 3, at 980.
187. See supra notes 174-179 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 220-244 and accompanying text.
189. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1212-14 & n.613.
190. Id. at 1350-51.
191. See id. at 1351.
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set out in Fairness Versus Welfare must, if it is to be consistent to its
own premises, remain open to the existence of preferences expressed in
non-market actions. Their statements indicate that they agree.'= And
such a system should be willing to accord non-market preferences significant weight in the social welfare calculus, as long as the reasonably
available data suggest they are strongly held. If there are intrinsic difficulties in giving quantitative values to such preferences, then, we would
argue, such difficulties do not imply that legal reform should go forward, ignoring non-market preferences and confining its attention to
preferences that are easily weighed. That would subordinate the ethical
imperative of promoting actual well-being to the intellectual desirability
of simplifying problems enough that they can fit into a formal economic
analysis, and yield clear results. That is not the spirit of welfare economics. That spirit, as Kaplow and Shavell stress against the theorists
of fairness, draws its "moral force" from being "grounded in the actual
situations of real individuals. "Ig3

E.

The Consequences of Privileging Preferences

We have argued above that the normative application of law and
economics requires much more explicit moral justification than it has
received in the past. Contemporary authors like Kaplow and Shavell,
Adler and Posner, and Chang have taken up that challenge, articulating
moral theories that differ in important ways but retain a focus on the
moral criterion of well-being. Our guiding question is whether they will
be able to implement those moral principles adequately in practice.
We have already pointed out one serious problem. These new moral
theories focus consciously on maximizing well-being, not social wealth.
This underlines the need for practical procedures that can improve on
textbook cost-benefit analysis by reducing the distortions caused by
wealth effects. Yet as we have seen, despite increased attention to the
problem and a good deal of hopeful prediction by Adler and Posner,
and Kaplow and Shavell, there is little practical progress. Rigorous
ways to go beyond market-price data remain few.
In Part I1 of this Article we will turn to two other problems to
which the new theories must respond. We show that there is empirical
evidence-much of it compiled by Kaplow and Shavell's fellow legal
economists-suggesting that Americans have substantial preferences for
perceived fairness and other values in the legal system. In addition,
192. See, e.g., id. at 1350 (noting that the question of the strength of individuals' tastes for
notions of fairness is an empirical question that is "best answered by statisticians and opinion
researchersn).
193. Id. at 1354.
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there is evidence that Americans prefer not to have economic and utilitarian methods of decision-making play a large role in their legal system. If such preferences exist, they must be dealt with one way or another. We test the adequacy of Kaplow and Shavell's responses to the
potential conflict that such preferences create.
In Part 111, we offer predictions about the future development of
law and economics. We suggest that the same discoveries about the
preferences of citizens that create problems for Kaplow and Shavell's
moral and practical positions are beginning to exercise an influence on
law and economics scholarship more generally. We present reasons to
suspect that in the years to come, economic theorists will begin advocating an increasingly distinctive and recognizable political programtoward increased control by professional regulatory agencies over the
traditional areas of common-law adjudication, toward increased secrecy
about government decision-making, and away from direct citizen participation in the formulation and application of legal policy.
11.

EVIDENCE OF LAW-RELATED
PREFERENCES

In this part, we address a hypothetical legal economist who has settled on one of the broadly consequentialist moral positions discussed in
the first part of this Article. We seek to direct this analyst's attention to
a factor that should be taken into account by the practical procedures he
chooses, and that should influence which legal policies he will recommend. This factor is law-related preferences: individuals' desires and
tastes with respect to the various aspects of their legal system. Such
preferences are relevant to the practice of law and economics in two
ways.
First, analysts should seek to detect and measure the satisfaction of
law-related preferences because their satisfaction is arguably a component of overall well-being. All the moral positions under discussion in
the current literature concur that the satisfaction of individual preferences often means an increase in well-being. Thus, to the extent that a
particular legal reform would violate people's conceptions of the legal
system, it may be inappropriate (morally inferior) to adopt it, even if
the legal reform would otherwise increase well-being; for example,
increasing the satisfaction of non-legal preferences. Law-related preferences may then act as a sort of brake, limiting the application of proposals that would otherwise emerge from a less comprehensive analysis. In Part 11-A, we set the stage for this possibility by arguing that
none of the major moral positions that analysts have recently proposed
can be interpreted to exclude all law-related preferences from their respective conceptions of well-being.
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Second, the American legal system is distinctive in the degree to
which it allows citizen actors-non-lawyers, non-bureaucrats-a significant role in implementing legal procedures and deciding outcomes, notably through the institution of the jury, but also as voters, litigants,
and in other roles. To the extent that lawyers or lay individuals have
law-related preferences, perceiving particular rules or practices as fair,
unfair, satisfying, improper, etc., these preferences are likely to influence their behavior as participants in the legal system. That likelihood
should be taken into account in formulating policies that rely on citizens
to implement legal rules. In this way, preferences may act not only as a
brake to legal reform, but also as a stumbling block.
Both of these considerations matter only if law-related preferences
are more than a figment of the theoretical imagination. Few doubt the
existence of strong, widely-shared, morally relevant preferences for
items like food, shelter, entertainment, and consumer goods. The robust market for these goods is a form of intuitive evidence for the reality and strength of the preferences for them. By contrast, there is no
obvious market for the satisfaction of law-related preferences. Our hypothetical reader may be skeptical: why worry about how to take account of "preferences" that may not even exist?
To answer that question, we collect in this Part the psychological
literature that gives evidence of the reality of people's tastes for legal
practices. We have divided this evidence into three categories. In Part
II.B, we discuss individual preferences for specific legal procedures.
We summarize the large psychological literature on "procedural justice" and conclude that individual preferences for specific kinds of procedure exist, seem to be strong, and are distinct from preferences for
the outcomes that those procedures are likely to produce. We discuss
the prospects for either integrating these preferences into applied economic analysis, or explaining them away.
In Part II.C, we discuss individual preferences for specific legal
rules. Experimental data on non-legal enforcement of norms and on
behavioral psychology both suggest that in some cases people may prefer one of a pair of competing legal rules over the other (e.g., property
rule protection over liability rule protection of a given entitlement in
tort law). We argue in particular that Professors Kaplow and Shavell,
who discuss this phenomenon, may have understated its importance.
However, we conclude that law and economics generally seems amenable to including legal rule preferences in the utility calculus.
In Part II.D, we discuss individual preferences for and against certain kinds of decision-making. The data here suggest that individuals
sometimes experience disutility when they are exposed to utilitarian or
economic decision-making procedures. We discuss several experiments
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describing this phenomenon. The prospect of this sort of law-related
preference is especially troubling for economic analysis because it
threatens to act as a "stumbling block," as discussed above. Such a
preference makes it hard to promote economic norms while retaining
citizen participation in the legal system.
Our aim is to convince analysts that there is a creature in the room;
it is not yet clear whether it is an 800-pound gorilla or mere 50-pound
Rottweiller. The various data we gather are similar enough, and sufficiently suggestive of real preferences, that they should not be ignored
or assumed away. There is a pressing need for more empirical studies
to fix the scope and strength of law-related preferences.Ig4 With this in
mind, we will close this part by considering one of the factors that is
most likely to limit the scope of law-related preferences: people's
knowledge of the law and its implications for our analysis considered in
Part 11. E.
A.

The Moral Relevance of Law-Related Preferences

If the right concept of well-being excludes the satisfaction of lawrelated preferences, then those preferences are relevant to economic
policy analysis only as a stumbling block (a cognitive factor that may
limit how well agents in the legal system do their jobs), not as a brake
194. A word should be said about the possibility of law-related preferences for specific legal
outcomes in individual cases, a topic we do not address in this Article. What we have in mind is
not, say, a contract plaintiffs preference for a verdict in his favor, which can largely be understood as a simple preference for a favorable financial outcome, not (exclusively) a preference for
justice. Rather, we mean the possibility that non-parties may have a cognizable preference for a
certain outcome in a particular legal case.
When welfare economists and agencies are weighing a project that will have an extensive
impact on the natural environment, they sometimes seek to measure the preferences of individuals who do not personally enjoy the environmental resources that would be damaged by the project, but who nevertheless are willing to pay to ensure that the environmental resource is preserved. These "disinterested" preferences are called existence values. See Implemenring CostBenefit, supra note 15, at 281-82 (criticizing the use of existence values by some government
agencies). Law-related preferences for legal outcomes, then, might be understood as existence
values that attach to events that occur in courtrooms, not events in the natural environment.
Again, we will not fully consider the possibility of such preferences in this Article. We note
however that courts in highly publicized cases sometimes feel obligated to acknowledge the force
of public sentiment in favor of a particular outcome. See, e.g.. In re Exxon Valdez, 1994 WL
182856, *8-9 (D. Alaska 1994). The court, in E m o n Valdez stated:
It is the function of both Congress and the courts (principally the courts of appeal
and supreme courts) to determine the extent to which public expectations with respect to financial responsibility are to be realized . . . . Were it otherwise, we
would have a form of organized anarchy in which no one could count on what rule
would apply at any given time or in any given situation.
Id.
One may also think of the conduct of the participants in the explosive rioting in Los Angeles
following the acquittal of Rodney King's police assailants. Whatever one's views of the moral
relevance, or indeed the moral value or defensibility, of that conduct, it is surely prima facie
evidence that many third parties held intense, law-related outcome preferences in King's case.
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(a morally relevant factor). Kaplow and Shavell's unrestrictedpreference view of well-being, however, clearly does include lawrelated preferences. Such preferences are closely akin to the "tastes for
fairness" that Kaplow and Shave11 carefully acknowledge should find a
place in proper economic analysis.
Adler and Posner's view of well-being is more nuanced. Recall that
Adler and Posner justify excluding moral and other disinterested preferences from their definition of well-being on the ground that an individual can hold such a preference and yet not believe that the outcome
she morally prefers would increase her own welfare.lgs Adler and Posner flatly reject Kaplow and Shavell's proposal to count tastes for fairness in the well-being calculus: "We do not believe that the fairness of
a project increases its [welfare value] insofar as persons prefer the project just because they judge it to be fair."'% Nevertheless, we think
Adler and Posner's position requires them to consider at least some
law-related preferences. It seems clear that if law-related preferences
exist, they may not always be disinterestedly "moral" in Adler and
Posner's sense. Sometimes they might be better understood, in whole or
in part, as simple affective tastes. Satisfying such law-related preferences presumably does increase the welfare of the individual who holds
them. As Chang points out, certain kinds of seemingly impersonal preferences may reflect the holder's feelings of sympathy or empathy for
other people-here, perhaps others who are subject to the legal system-and thus cannot be dismissed as having no welfare effect on the
preference holder.'" It seems psychologically implausible to deny that
legal rules and practices can sometimes make individuals (even those
who are not in danger of violating the rules, or benefiting directly from
them) "feel better" or "feel worse," in a straightforward way, about
themselves and their community.
More fundamentally, the distinction between personal and disinterested preferences carries with it a good deal of philosophical and psychological baggage. From many credible philosophical perspectives,
including an Aristotelian one, the fact that a legal rule or practice is
perceived as morally right provides, in itself, a reason to take pleasure
in it.''' Indeed, Adler and Posner themselves admit that the distinction
between personal preferences and "moral" or "dis'interested" preferences is extremely difficult to define coherently and may be philosophi195. See Rerhinking Cost-Benefir, supra note 15, at 199-200.
196. Id. at 244.
197. See Chang. supra note 75. at 188.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 11 (Terence Irwin trans.. 1999) ("[Tlhe things
198. Cf. ARISTOTLE.
that please lovers of the fine are things pleasant by nature: Actions in accord with virtue are
pleasant by nature, so that they both please lovers of the fine and are pleasant in their own
right.").
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cally indefen~ible.'~~
At best, we think, an analyst who adopts Adler
and Posner's approach to economic analysis must address the relevance
of law-related preferences on a case-by-case basis.
An analyst like Howard Chang, who supports a "liberal theory of
social welfare,"200is more likely to take the categorical view that lawrelated preferences are "external preference^"^^' and hence irrelevant.
Chang, again, holds that external preferences should not be included in
the calculation of well-being because they are incompatible with "the
liberal ideals underlying utilitarianism. "2m
Some possible law-related preferences clearly fail Chang's test. An
individual's preference for Jim Crow laws, held on the ground that such
laws express a valid racial hierarchy, must be excluded. It is a quintessential example of the sort of "racist or malicious preferences," premised on inequality, that Chang rejects.203But suppose a different circumstance. Imagine a group of citizens who prefer a highly moralistic,
promise-centered conception of contract law, one that emphasizes the
availability of specific performance and that uses mandatory rules. Suppose further that these citizens want a moralistic contract regime not on
economic grounds (they do not have views on whether it will allocate
resources more or less efficiently than other contract regimes), but
rather because they believe moralistic contract law is in keeping with
the dignity of treatment that (they believe) all rational beings owe alike
to one another. This is a law-related preference. It is premised on a
non-utilitarian philosophy; it is a "taste for fairness" in Kaplow and
Shavell's lexicon. And it is an external preference: the group would
prefer that a particular set of contract rules govern all the members of
their society, not just themselves.
Does such a preference, in Chang's words, really "deny the equal
concern and respect" that is "owe[d] all individuals," so as to justify
excluding it entirely from welfare analysis, even if it is strongly held?2M
Many points of view that may lead individuals to prefer certain legal
rules or institutions are premised on understandings of the meaning of
human equality that, while not identical to the views of liberal utilitarians like Chang, are hardly so different from them, or so repugnant, that
it would be "awkward" to give them some weight in the welfare calcu-

199. See Rethinking Cost-Benefit. supra note 15. at 202 ("[HIOWto provide a more precise
and persuasive account of this 'restriction' remains a large and unsolved problem within the
philosophical literature on well-being."); see id. at 202 n.98 (compiling sources).
200. Chang, supra note 75, at 196.
201. Id. at 183.
202. Id. at 185.
203. Id. at 178.
204. Id. at 185.
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1~s.'" Chang supports a liberal theory of welfare. But to the extent that
Chang's theory denies real, felt preferences based on worldviews that
do not sort with liberal utilitarian philosophy, its claim to being a genuinely welfare theory is diminished; it reduces to a simple imposition of
liberal preferences on the community. Presumably Chang would admit
that the traits an individual perceives in her natural and physical environment can powerfully influence that individual's well-being. Why,
then, be so quick to exclude the individual's perceptions of her social
and institutional environment? Further, in America one would expect
that legal institutions would form an especially important part of that
environment.
We think these arguments should give liberal legal economists
pause about excluding law-related preferences from welfare calculations. Having made our case for the relevance of law-related preferences, we turn at last to evidence for their reality.

B. Tastesfor Procedural Justice
From a traditional economic standpoint, procedure is a transaction
cost: a necessary evil in a legal system whose chief purpose is to create
incentives for welfare maximizing behavior.'06 Analysts like Kaplow
and Shavell reject using independent notions of fairness to design legal
procedures. They argue that doing so will distort the ability of the system to produce well-being maximizing outcomes.207
Nevertheless, Kaplow and Shavell concede that, as in all areas of
the law, individual tastes about legal procedures are an essential part of
a proper welfare economics analysis. Kaplow and Shavell assert that
tastes for procedures should "be weighted according to the extent individuals actually would be willing in principle to expend resources to
benefit from [them]."208The relevant inquiry, then, is how strongly do
people care about how the adjudication system works?209Kaplow and
Shavell have an intuition: "We suspect that individuals do not have sufficiently positive tastes for legal procedures [to change the outcome of a
welfare analysis]. "*I0 We also have an intuition: they are wrong.
205. Chang, supra note 75, at 187.
206. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1165 ("The inherently instrumental character of
procedure suggests that largely nonconsequentialist notions of fairness in procedure are inappropriate to employ.").
207. See id. at 1174-80.
208. Id. at 1211.
209. In this Article. we have separated the analysis of legal procedure into two components: a
discussion of outcomes ("the availability of legal redressn) and a discussion of modes of adjudication ("the manner in which adjudication is conductedn). Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at
1211.
210. See id. at 1216.
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Our intuition is supported by twenty-five years of empirical and
psychological literature suggesting that individuals have independent
tastes for certain legal procedures. The basic conclusion of the literature is that individuals' happiness or unhappiness with the legal system
is partially independent of the disposition of their case. Process can
create its own ~ t i l i t y . ~ "
This understanding is in conflict with the functionalist's parasitic
conception of procedure discussed above. It threatens to complicate
welfare-economic analysis. Therefore, it is not surprising that Kaplow
and Shavell, among others, attack the procedural justice literature on a
variety of grounds.212However, before describing this attack in greater
detail, we would first like to explain exactly what it is empiricists have
thus far asked, and concluded, about individual preferences for legal
procedures. Thus, in Part 1I.B. 1 we describe the history, methodology,
experimental data, and findings of procedural researchers. In Part
II.B.2 we compare and contrast the competing psychological theories
about preferences that researchers have constructed from this experimental data. In Part II.B.3 we discuss scholarly criticism of this research, and attempt to integrate it into the welfare economic paradigm.

I. Procedural Justice in Review
In 1975, John Thibault and Laurens Walker published their seminal
Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. In that book, the two
researchers argued that individuals hold significant preferences for certain kinds of procedures, specifically a preference for perceived fairness and a preference for process control.213
Thibault and Walker began by positing a difference between preferences about distributive justice (the way that things of value are allocated among persons or groups) and procedural justice (the modes of
dispute resolution). They then attempted to explore the former preferences by asking individuals, in a variety of contexts, how they liked
their disputes resolved.
They found, first, that individuals prefer adversarial procedures to
inquisitorial ones,214even though that control might not actually lead to

211. This argument is not a moral case for the intrinsic value of procedural justice. For such
an argument, see Laurens Walker et al., The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Jusrice, 65 VA. L . REV. 1401, 1402-03 (1979).
212. See Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3, at 1212 n.613.
213. Thibault and Walker argued that individuals preferred processes that they could control
over ones that were controlled by a third party. JOHN THIBAULT & LAURENSWALKER,
PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE :A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
13-14, 117-24 (1975).
214. Id. at 72-77.
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an accurate presentation of the facts.215This result held true even when
the adversary process led to an adverse outcome216and when Thibault
and Walker investigated the preferences of observers of legal proceedings, rather than participant^.^"
The two psychologists theorized that people's taste for adversary
litigation (both as litigants and as members of society) related to their
preferred distribution of control over the process between disputants
and decision-makers. Simply put, fair procedures are seen to give litigants control; unfair procedures do not. People see ultimate decisions
as fairer when the process that generated them was litigant led; and vice
versa.
Finally, Thibault and Walker proposed a connection between preferences for procedural and distributive justice. They argued that individuals prefer process control because it enables them to retain control
over outcomes that they desire. Thus, Thibault and Walker saw procedural justice as an important factor in individuals' understanding of
distributive justice, but primarily a derivative one. Their instrumental
argument for process values is summed up by their prescient message to
the then-emerging law and economics movement: "any assessment of
the economic factor [e.g., costs of procedures] ought to take into account the social cost of a procedural system that either repeatedly fails
to furnish accurate results or repeatedly fails to furnish results acceptable to the subjects of the process. "218
E. Allan Lind and Tom R. Tyler, the second major duo of the procedural justice literature, expanded on Thibault's and Walker's work in
their 1988 book, The Social Psychology of Procedural J ~ s t i c e . ~Lind's
"
and Tyler's significant contribution lies in their constructing a psychological theory to explain why individuals care about procedure: the
"group value" theory. That theory argues that people are strongly affected by identification within groups, and that these groups are defined
both by their "group identities" (unique shared characteristics) and their
"group procedures."
The former defines the group in its relationship
to the outside world; the latter regulates how the group regulates it-

215. Thibault and Walker found that adversaries skewed unhelpful facts to favor themselves.
Thus. presented with evidence reflecting a 25/75 skew. adversaries presented a 36164 spin. Inquisitorial opponents did not. Moreover, the individuals knew they were putting a slant on the
facts. See id. at 32-40.
216. See id. at 76.
217. Id. at 93, 113-16 (detailing a behind-the-Rawlsian-veil preference for adversary system).
218. THIBAULT & WALKER, supra note 213. at 123.
219. For a general review of Lind's and Tyler's work, see Paul G. Chevigny. Fairness and
Participation. 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1211 (1989) (book review).
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE
220. E. ALLANLIND& TOMR. TYLER.THESOCIAL
230-37 (1988).
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self."' Thus, our society's procedure is tied to our sense of identity:
when procedures are unfair, our group (and thus our self) identity is
damaged.222
This general description of Lind's and Tyler's theory threatens to
understate the strength of their book. They first offer a sophisticated
critique of Thibault and Walker, focusing on the link in the earlier
work between process control and distributive justice. Thibault and
Walker believed that control over evidence and arguments would have
both direct psychological effects on people, and indirect effects on
institutional legitimacy. If people perceived processes to be fair, then
they would also experience more happiness in the outcomes that they
received. It would follow that people's preferences for process reflect a
desire for a fair outcome rather than an external
By contrast,
Lind and Tyler argue for entirely different understanding of process
preferences, one that places them in a primary position vis-a-vis outcomes.
In practice, this means that Lind and Tyler had to test the relationship between perceptions of outcomes and perceptions of procedures.
Summarizing various studies, Lind and Tyler concluded that regardless
of whether individuals receive favorable or unfavorable legal outcomes,
a fair process makes them more accepting of the outcomes and the legal
system in genera^."^ Fair legal process, they argued, "increase[s] satisfaction and . . . ameliorate[s] discontent across a wide variety of legal
situations.
The authors demonstrated the importance of process through their
discussion of the "legitimation" effe~t."~
Summarizing various earlier
researchers, Lind and Tyler found that procedural unfairness could lead
to erosion of individuals' obedience to the law, although the effect was
somewhat indirect."' But just as importantly, individuals accept decisions that they perceived to have been procedurally fair with greater
frequency."* Lind and Tyler concluded that when process is fair, dis-

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. LIND & TYLER, supra note 220. at 96.
224. See id. at 66-76. The authors note that this preference may be less strong when outcomes
are severe: a defendant facing certain execution would be less concerned with process than an
individual facing a relatively insignificant traffic court fine. However, they cite studies suggesting the opposite is true. Thus, a study found that felony defendants' evaluation of their treatment
by the system depended more on process than outcome (the severity of their sentences). Id. at
73.
225. Id. at 75.
226. See generally TOMR. TYLER,WHYPEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
227. LIND& TYLER,supra note 220, at 76-81.
228. Id. at 81 (summarizing individual willingness to refrain from challenging arbitration
awards).
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putes do not fester (and thus are not appealed).ug
Unfortunately, arguing for a "fairness" preference is question begging. Welfare economics, in particular, would need a more detailed
account of what preferences individuals had for different legal procedures in different contexts. Happily, Lind and Tyler have begun this
accounting. They explain that, in contexts as diverse as plea bargaining,
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) proceedings and jury design, individuals prefer one particular characteristic consistently: litigant control
over proceeding^."^
However, this preference for litigant control does not, in and of itself, decide the question of whether process preferences are simply derivative of self-interested outcome preferences. Lind and Tyler attempted to separate out these effects by considering individual tastes for
presenting an argument, while detaching that effect from the outcome
of that argument. In effect they sought to answer whether it makes people feel good to present an argument to a judge, even when they know
the argument will not affect the outcome of the trial. Drawing upon a
series of prior lab studies, Lind and Tyler concluded that procedural
preferences do indeed reflect a strong "voice" effect.231
First, Lind and Tyler examined an earlier study finding that individuals who were allowed simply to discuss how decisions would be
made (without actually having decisionmaking power) felt better about
later outcomes arising from those discussions than individuals who were
not allowed to discuss them."2 Of course, individuals were even more
pleased when allowed to actually help design these decision-making
procedure^.^^ However, evidence that preference expression has its
own utility supports Lind and Tyler's conception of an independent
taste for process.
The two authors also drew on a study by Tyler that tested the
strength of the process-control effect by manipulating the bias, competence and consideration of the decision-maker, and by varying the substantiality of the outcomes involved.u4 Tyler found that the processcontrol effect disappeared only when the disputants' decision-maker
was seen not to have listened to the disputant."' Having one's views
considered is thus more important than having one's view prevail, at

229. Id. at 82.
230. Id. at 84-92.
231. Id. at 100-05.
supra note 220, at 102 (citing L. Musante et al., The Effects of Control
232. LIND& TYLER,
on Perceived Fairness of Procedures and Outcomes. 19 J . EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 223 (1983)).
233. Id. at 100-05.
234. Id. at 104.
235. Id.
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least in evaluations of how fair legal procedures areeu6
Now the simple conclusion that people experience some utility by
either making arguments themselves, or having advocates do so for
them, is not yet the kind of data that can be plugged easily into a welfare economic analysis. It is necessary to measure the strength of this
preference relative to other preferences that might be served by the legal system.u7 However, if people value process as highly as Lind and
Tyler believe that they do, then the design of legal policy must incorporate a concern for the means by which they will be implemented, as
well as the allocative ends to be served by the policies. And if preferences for procedure are not just deeply held, but also widely spread,
then ignoring them might undermine the behavior shaping premises of
the welfare economic
More recent research in the field has confirmed and expanded upon
Lind's and Tyler's conclusions. Thus, a 1990 study examined what
would happen if, after a decision had been made, informed individuals
were simply allowed to present their arguments to the decision-maker.
Fully aware that these arguments would have no effect, individuals allowed to speak nevertheless felt more fairly treated than those who
were not-a pure process effect.239Similarly, a researcher examined the
effect of experts in courtrooms, and concluded that adversarial experts
(as opposed to court-appointed ones) lent more legitimacy to the process in the eyes of the losing party.240
The consistent message of this work is that individuals have an independent taste for fair procedures, which is primarily defined as having a voice in the decision-making process. When this taste is not respected, individuals lose faith in the distributive outcomes and in the
236. The rules of evidence, which often preclude disputants from articulating their views as
they would like, are also structured to help some disputants (especially criminal defendants)
prevail. Thus, to the extent that criminal defendants hold preferences about procedure that are
similar to those of the population in general, those preferences may be in conflict with the disputant's more immediate self-interest. See id. at 106.
237. In Part II.C.3, infra, we discuss in more detail the legal economists' critiques of
psychological research. Lind and Tyler do discuss this issue, concluding that the relative strength
of procedural fairness preferences vis a vis distributionallcost concerns varies across situations,
although usually fairness was the dominant preference. Id. at 139.
238. In other words, if procedure influences legitimacy, which influences compliance, then
procedure could affect individual behavior just as much as the substantive legal rules that are
applied through procedural practices. Alternatively, if procedure influences litigation behavior
directly (e.g.. by inducing individuals to appeal or not to appeal from legal results), then it will
add to the social costs of litigation and thus affect the utility calculus directly.
239. E.A. Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments. 59 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 952-59
(1990).
240. Robert Mark Johnstone, Perceptions of Justice: An Examination of the Effects of Type
of Expert, Verdict, Role, and Trial Experience on Procedural Justice Judgments 50-65 (199G)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon) (on file with the Harvard Law School
library).
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system itself. Respecting this taste, on the other hand, can create faith
in the system even though the procedures fail to protect disputants from
bad outcomes.241The empirical data supporting the Thibault-WalkerLind-Tyler research should cause Kaplow and Shavell to reconsider
their "intuition" that procedures do not matter to the populace.242
2.

Competing Explanatory Models

We now turn to a brief explanation of what might motivate individuals to value procedural justice, even in the face of evidence about
its costs. There are two competing theories about why individuals exhibit tastes for certain procedures. The first, Thibault's and Walker's
self-interest model, suggests that individuals seek control over decisions
(through a fair process) because they want to retain an effect upon
them.243The second, Lind's and Tyler's group-value model, argues that
procedure creates group identity, and violations of norms of procedure
thus undermine self-identity.244
These two competing theories imply different predictions about
what .kinds of procedures individuals will prefer (and also about
whether such preferences are internally stable or externally manipulable). The self-interest model predicts the following variables that will
strongly influence individual's judgments about procedure: "(1) the
favorability of the procedure to the perceiver, (2) the amount of control
over outcomes afforded the perceiver, (3) the fairness of the outcomes
provided by the procedure, and (4) the consistency with which the procedure is applied across people. "245
On the other hand, the group-value model predicts that procedural
preferences would vary based on the ethical characteristic of each
group, but would generally include a preference for value expression
and dignified treatment. Second, the group value model predicts that
procedures will be more important for individuals who are uncertain of
their status within society and those who are traditionalist^.^^^
We find Lind and Tyler's group-value theory somewhat more plau241. Lind and Tyler analyze this problem as one of "false consciousness," and they reason
that one might cause individuals to experience utility by manipulating their procedural preferences, even though the system is, in truth, stacked against them. LIND& TYLER, supra note 220,
at 4. 76, 201-02. However. they note that if experimental subjects find out about this deception.
the perceived benefits of voice and control disappear. Id.
242. See LIND & TYLER. supra note 220, at 217 (describing how procedural preferences
should cause law and economists tqreconsider outcome-based evaluations of utility).
243. See THIBAULT
& WALKER,
supra note 213, at 120-23. But cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 3, at 1164-65 (stressing that procedural preferences should be treated as merely derivative
of preferences for favorable outcomes).
244. LIND &TYLER.
supra note 220. at 231.
245. Id. at 226.
246. Id. at 238.
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sible as an explanation of why process matters to individuals. As we
interpret the relevant literature, we think most researchers working in
this area would agree that as a theory it has been better at predicting the
actual behavior of real people.247However, there may well be a middle
ground between the two models that would explain both why people
care about procedure, even when it is divorced from outcome, and why
they seem to care somewhat less about it when outcomes are unfavorable.248
3.

Objections to the Procedural Preference Literature

There have been several major strands of criticism directed at the
procedural justice researchers. First, critics have argued that laboratory
preferences are entirely artificial (e-g., reflecting what people believe
to be "nice" rather than what they want).249Second, scholars criticize
the procedural justice literature for its inability to sharply separate preferences for procedures from preferences for desired outcomes.250Third,
critics have argued that, even if laboratory preference rankings are not
artificial, they fail to convey any information about how much people
actually value goods.251We address each of these criticisms in turn.

a. Are Laboratory Results Real?
The most significant of the three criticisms is the claim that laboratory results do not expose real preferences but rather pieties of fairness
that individuals would not honor if it came to making hard tradeoffs in
practice.252Kaplow and Shavell contrast the procedural justice findings
247. See id. at 239-40 (arguing for the model, but noting that differences in how people react
to bad outcomes is not explained by theory); see also Jody Karen Clay-Werner, Perceptions of
Gender Bias in the Legal System: A Procedural Justice Account 53-54, 75 (1997) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)) (on file with the Harvard College
Library) (summarizing recent research and refining model); Johnstone, supra note 240, at 23-25
(summarizing recent research). But see James Lea, Who Cares About Procedural Justice: An
Examination of Individual Differences 136-41 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's
University) (finding, in study focusing on individual differences, that evidence for each theory
varied based on both internal characteristics of subjects and situational characteristics of the
experiment).
248. LIND &TYLER, supra note 220, at 240-41 (describing potential hybrid theories).
249. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1212 11.613; see also Chevigny, supra note 219, at
1212.
250. See, e.g., Robert M . Hayden & Jill K. Anderson, On the Evaluation of Procedural
Systems in Laboratory Experiments: A Critique of Thibault and Walker, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
21 (1979).
251. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1214.
252. Chevigny, supra note 219, at 1212 ("[S]ubjects who seem to prefer neutral procedures
may be expressing political pieties to which they think it would be best to appear to subscribe.").
Sometimes criticism is directed to the use of college students, who are somewhat unrepresentative of the population at large, as experimental subjects. See Samuel R. Gross, The American
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with polls in which individuals claim to be concerned with legal costs253
and with the economists' own intuitions that Americans are simply ignorant of legal p r o c e d ~ r e They
. ~ ~ conclude that the procedural justice
literature stemming from Thibault's work reflects simply opinions
about policy, not tastes for procedure.255
We agree that the issue is not concluded, but,we are skeptical about
Kaplow's and Shavell's skepticism. The procedural justice literature has
not yet assigned a market value to procedural preferences. Yet, unless
that is to be made an inflexible condition of the relevance of psychological literature, the procedural justice literature is sufficiently corroborated that legal economists ought to be troubled by it. There have
been twenty-five years of academic research demonstrating that preferences about procedure are ~ignificant.~'~
Moreover, in Lind's and Tyler's work (and in the work of later supporting authors), real-world
tests of these procedures have confirmed the existence of significant
preferences for p r o c e d ~ r e Simply
. ~ ~ saying that laboratory work has no
explanatory power seems, in the words of Lind and Tyler, a "spurious"
response for fellow social scientists to make.258
Moreover, critics of procedural preferences, such as Kaplow and
Shavell, do not offer compelling evidence demonstrating that they are
laboratory artifacts. They assert that procedural preferences are outcome dependent because successful parties do not care about unfair
procedure^.^^ The published evidence suggests otherwise.260 In addition, the preferences of individual litigants are not the only preferences
that are relevant to the design of welfare-maximizing legal procedure~.'~'Kaplow and Shavell point to a plank of the Republican Party's
1994 political platform, the Contract With America, and suggest that it
demonstrates that citizens (or perhaps only Republican voters) do not
Advantage: The Value of Ineflicient Litigation, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 734, 740 n.22 (1987).
253. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1214 n.614.
254. Id. at 1164-65.
255. Id. at 1214.
256. Lea, supra note 247, at 12-18.
257. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & R. Folger, Distributional and Procedural Aspects of Satisfaction with Citizen-Police Encounters, 1 BASIC AND APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL.281-92 (1980); see
also LIND & TYLER. supra note 220, at 48-57 (discussing field studies). Cf. Chevigny, supra
note 219, at 1212 (concluding that "[tlhere is enough evidencen to support Lind and Tyler's
experimental data).
258. LIND& TYLER, supra note 220. at 43.
259. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3. at 1215.
260. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 220, at 67-73 (discussing the effect of procedure on
positive outcomes and concluding that individual's preference for fair procedures is present,
though attenuated, even when people win at trial).
261. This is so because it is possible that all members of society would be willing to pay a
certain amount (or would pay that amount if they had funds equal to others) to ensure that procedures remained fair. Thus, although individual litigants might prefer not to have a jury trial in
the individual case, the preferences of society as a whole might require it as an option.
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have tastes for procedural justice.262We are unconvinced that such a
promise, never enacted into
and part of a platform largely modified and rejected,'@ is sufficient evidence against the appeal of procedural fairness.
Finally, even if it were true that successful litigants do not care
about procedure, and that the public in general had expressed no tastes
for it, the preferences of unsuccessful litigants would remain, and these
should be significant to welfare economists who are committed to count
all preferences. The clear message of the procedural justice literature is
that unsuccessful litigants are more satisfied with legal institutions, are
less likely to appeal decisions, are more satisfied with outcomes, and
are generally happier when they have some control over procedures
than when they do not.265Criticism of the procedural justice literature
that does not consider these findings is inconclusive.
b.

Is the Procedural Preference Literature Methodologically Flawed?

Some criticisms of the procedural justice literature single it out as
especially flawed because of its inability to separate outcomepreferences reliably from procedural ones.266Indeed, Lind and Tyler
themselves explicitly point out this methodological problem in previous
research.267There are reasons to believe that Lind and Tyler's school of
procedural justice research has begun to design experiments that can
separate outcome preferences from procedure preferences.

c.

Do Procedural Preferences Convey Relevant Welfare
Information ?

A third criticism of procedural preferences is that they do not con-

262. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3. at 1214 n.614.
263. Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in Georgia and
Reflections on Tort Reform, 30 GA. L. REV. 627. 629 n.2 (1996) (reviewing legislative history of
federal bill and noting that it was vetoed by President Clinton).
264. GOP Marks Contracts Anniversary, DALLASMORNINGNEWS, Sept. 28, 1997, at 8A
("Although much of the Contract With America had been enacted, some has passed in heavily
modified forms, and at least one major element-term limits for members of Congress-was
rejected.").
265. See infra Part II.C.l and notes therein; see also Chevigny, supra note 219, at 1217.
266. Con~pareVladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, External Validity of Research in
Legal Psychology, 3 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV.39 (1979) (discussing problems with laboratory
psychology generally) with Hayden & Anderson, supra note 250 (critiquing Thibault and
Walker's work).
267. LIND & TYLER. Supra note 220. at 129-45 (discussing experiments attempting to isolate
the difference).

Law and Economics
vey information in a form usable by economists.268This criticism reduces to a demand for dollars: how much will people be willing to pay
to satisfy their supposed tastes for fairness in procedure?269
We agree with this criticism in one sense: it rightly points out that
the procedural justice literature does not ask individuals to balance the
costs of implementing procedures against the benefits of satisfying preferences. It is thus difficult to tell exactly how much individuals value
the voice and fairness effects discussed above. We endorse welfare
economists' call for more experimental data about procedural preference~.~~~
However, we note that simply using willingness to pay as a measure
of utility (or disutility) is not consistent with the moral theories of wellbeing that Kaplow and Shavell and other contemporary theorists endorse. Simply asking people how much they will pay for procedure
could conceivably omit important distributional and psychological information relevant to the encompassing "well-being" norm endorsed by
Kaplow and Sha~e11.~~'
In other words, some sort of non-market correction will probably have to be applied to the market data in any event.
Furthermore, we suspect that any evidence of procedural preferences that is likely to appear in the future will not take the form of actual market transactions. Considerable inference and extrapolation will
be required in order to assign a number value to preferences. Official
legal procedures are not priced on a competitive market like television
sets. Kaplow and Shavell discuss the common use of alternative dispute
resolution procedures, but recognize that they are not decisive evidence
against procedural preferences.272They imagine hypothetical legislation
that might set a "price tag" on procedural preferences, thus permitting
a form of direct measurement of procedural preferences." However,
barring some unanticipated legislative reforms, that experiment would
also have to be conducted in a laboratory setting, or by polling individuals about their preferences. If those results suggested strong preferences, would welfare economists then impugn the poll data as mere
268. Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3, at 1212 n.Gl3 ("The basic problem is that most prior
empirical work does not seem to have been designed in a manner that could identify or quantify
actual tastes for procedures."). That is, most of the procedural preference literature falls into the
category that Hovenkamp describes as "'subjective' information about preference[s]." rather than
the "revealed market preference" that economists know how to work with. Hovenkamp, supra
note 121. at 37.
269. Kaplow and Shavell offer a hypothetical designed to expose this very quantity, and believe that it would prove their point about the relative worthlessness of procedural tastes. Kaplow
& Shavell. supra note 3, at 1216.
270. For a critique of such work into "revealed preferences," see id. at 55-59.
271. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
272. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1216.
273. See id.
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artifacts? This could have serious theoretical consequences. For example, the law and economics commentators discussed in Part I agree that
it is morally necessary, when performing economic analysis of law, to
use practical procedures that compensate for distributive effects in order to make valid interpersonal utility comparisons possible. How are
analysts in other contexts going to gauge variations in the marginal utility of income without using poll data, or something equally speculative?
We simply mean to emphasize that there is a limit to the extent to
which Kaplow, Shavell, and the other new legal economists can be parsimonious about admitting experimental data of preferences that are not
in the form of market prices, and yet still claim to have rejected crude
theories of wealth maximization.
The challenge for experimental research is clear. There is a need
for experiments that attempt to separate what is an expression of a "piety" from what is a genuine procedural taste-in other words, a need to
force people to make relatively hard choices-preferably against a
wealth-neutral backdrop such as a hypothetical standardized budget-so
that we can be sure that their preferences are just that. Our intuition is
that the procedural justice literature will hold up under this pressure. If
real preferences separate themselves from the chaff, we have argued
that welfare economics must incorporate them into the utility calculus.

C. Tastes for Legal Rules

A welfare-economic analysis that did not take into account any
preferences for specific legal rules that exist would fail to promote
well-being, as understood by the current conceptions of welfare econ o m i c ~ In
. ~this
~ ~ section we present evidence of such preferences. We
discuss two psychological patterns that inform people's attitudes toward
different possible legal rules. Such preferences may be more likely to
come into play among litigants, jurors, lawyers, and similar participants in the legal system. Other people will often be unaware of these
rule-pairs or fail to understand them. Even to the extent that they do
comprehend the choice available, they might be indifferent about their
outcome, whether because they believe the content of legal rules will
not affect them," or that it should not.276
In Part 1I.C. 1, we discuss two general types of preference for legal
274. See id. at 1350.
275. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEG. STUD.
537. 543-44 (1998) (discussing the unimportance of the implied warrantylcaveat lessee pair of
rules for individuals in the middle of a term lease).
27G. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
6 0 4 4 (1991) (arguing that some residents of a close knit community believed that resort to the
law violated a norm of "good neighborliness").

20021

Law and Economics

391

rules: attributively fair rules; and endowment protecting ones. We then,
in Part II.C.2, attempt to apply these general preferences to situations
of policy choice confronted by legal economists.
I.

Preferences for Rules

From a merely outcome-centered welfare economic perspective,
preferences for one legal rule, as such, over another are obstacles in the
way to efficient legal reform. Like preferences for procedure, preferences for rules make legal analysis based on promoting well-being more
difficult to perform, less reliable, or both-unless those preferences are
relatively weak or malleable.
A developing body of psychological evidence suggests that legal
rules reflect common sense attributions of responsibility and blame.
That is, the perceived fairness of a legal rule depends on whether it
comports with how individuals believe the law should attribute responsibility among different moral actors. This proposition is fleshed out in
a forthcoming article by Jon Hanson and Ana re ye^.^^^ It is supported
by a psychological framework known as attribution theory."' To the
extent that Hanson and Reyes can establish clear differences in the degree of fairness that individuals perceive in different rules, their work
will also suggest the existence of corresponding preferences for the
rules viewed as fair. Under many theories of well-being, such preferences must be viewed as a component of well-being. That will tend to
contradict Kaplow and Shavell's view that legal rule preferences are of
little significance to welfare economics.279
Internalized tastes for fair rules are not the only tastes that weIfare
economics must recognize. Individuals also prefer (and are in theory
willing to pay for) legal rules that protect entitlements that they believe
they already own.280To the extent that individuals value rules that re277. Jon D. Hanson and Ana Reyes. Attribution Theory (unpublished partial manuscript on
file with authors).
278. Cf. Bernard Weiner. An Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and Emotion, 92
PSYCHOL. REV. 548 (1985) (providing a history of the theory).
279. Kaplow and Shavell argue that tastes for "fairn punishments can be considered as a part
of the utility calculus when they exist, but believe that such occasions are rare. See Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 3, at 1291 n.800. ("Our conjecture is that, for many violations of the law,
individuals will not have strong independent tastes regarding the level of punishment.").
280. Most of this literature is framed in terms of the effect of rules on how individuals value
goods. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer. Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to
U . L.Q. 59 (1993) (reviewing literature);
Accept: Legal and Economic Implications. 71 WASH.
see also Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J . POL. ECON.
1325 (1990) (describing a famous experiment involving valuations of
coffee mugs); Daniel Kahneman et al.. The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo
Bias, 5 J. ECONPERSP.193 (1991). However, this increase in valuation can be viewed as quantifying a taste for the type of protection that the rule offers. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest
Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1541 (1998) (finding

392

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 53:2:335

spect initial allocations of property entitlements over their reverses,
these preferences would presumably be incorporated into the welfare
calculus as well.
Another type of rule-preference may correspond to the role of judicial precedent. We introduce this factor because behavioral psychology
research reveals that individuals consistently prefer the current state of
affairs to a changed one. In plain language, they (and we) have a taste
for the status
Evidence for this bias is varied and strong. Individuals choose to
remain at their jobs rather than switch to other, higher paying ones.282
They tend to keep their current phone or electrical services over new
ones that might be more reliable.283In the legal context, they tend to
prefer default contract terms over new ones (even though the new ones
might benefit them).284
Although in some cases the disruptions from a change in law that
violated the status quo effect would be relatively negligible, in some
cases they are significant.285We do not know how welfare economics
should proceed. The only options seem to be as follows: (1) always
ignore status quo bias effects as uninformed,286(2) ignore status quo
bias effects when they could be confused with other preferences whose
effects are more easily quantified,287(3) incorporate status quo bias effects in every welfare calculus as a small (general) cost incurred when

that the endowment effect occurs when goods are protected by property rules and not liability
rules, thus property rules alone create (and are expressed by) the relevant preference).
281. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 280, at 70 (discussing status quo bias); see also
Russell B. Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power
L. REV. 1583 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin. The
of Default Rules and Form Terms. 51 VAND.
Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELLL. REV. 608 (1998) [hereinafter
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias] (results of study about contract terms). Cf. William Samuelson
& Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
7, 8
(1988) ("Faced with new options, decisionmakers often stick with the status quo alternative.");
see also Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene, Determinants of Insensitivity to Quantity in Valuation
of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Constraints, Availability, and Prominence, 2
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED107, 113 (1996) (testing strength of bias in various populations).
282. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky. Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
P~YCHOLOG
341,
I ~ T348 (1984).
283. See Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 106 Q.J.
ECON. 141, 143 (1991).
284. See Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias, supra note 281, at 646-48.
285. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH.
U . L.Q. 347, 361-62 (1996)
(discussing how status quo bias might create a preference for non-wealth maximizing standardized contracting terms even between commercial actors).
286. Absent any real data about the informational content of preferences for legal rules, Kaplow and Shavell appear to take this position. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1350-55.
287. See Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias, supra note 281, at 626 n.58 (discussing the confusion between status quo effects and endowment effects).
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one changes rules,288or (4) incorporate status quo bias effects on a
case-by-case basis.289
2.

Specific Applications

People's individual preferences for rules, their general bias for the
status quo, and the endowment effect come together in interesting ways
in the property rulelliability rule puzzle. The puzzle of whether property or liability rules most efficiently protect property rights is a central
question of the law and economic literature, with most commentators
arguing that liability rule protections facilitate bargaining and therefore
maximize efficien~y.'~
However, in recent years, law-and-behavioralism's viral insights
have infected even this venerable cathedral of the law and economic
debate.291One key insight is that initial ownership of a property right
makes individuals even less willing to bargain it away.'% A few legal
economists, including Kaplow and Shavell, have responded that this
evidence provides an "unclear and unhelpful" guide to analysis.293
Most, however, have grappled with the exact content of the data, ques288. Empirical researchers would presumably establish the social costs of changing rules in a
general case by averaging highly publicized and lowly publicized changes together.
289. Thus, overturning Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), might create a higher status-quo
bias cost than overruling United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). which is a decision of
comparable legal importance, but one less likely to have penetrated the public consciousness.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (arguing that
certain socially momentous legal decisions are entitled to special precedential force).
290. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (reasoning that liability
rules are more likely to encourage bargaining when transactions costs are high); see also Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis. 109
HARV.L. REV. 713 (1996) (arguing that liability rules are almost always appropriate). Cf. James
E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another
Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995) (suggesting that dispositive resolution of the dilemma is
impossible).
291. See Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 280; cf. Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future
Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1777-81 (1998) (arguing that
presence of endowment effect makes normative policy analyses impossible absent further research).
292. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 3; see also Daniel Kahneman et al., supra note 280.
293. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 745-48. Kaplow and Shavell divide their argument
against the usefulness of entitlement psychology into three parts. First, they point out that allocating a property rule to one party means not allocating it to another-a preference for property
rules can not inform who should receive the initial entitlement. Id. Second, they point out that to
the extent that initial allocation has created a bond, its breaking can be analyzed in utilitarian
ways. Id. To us, this means that the strength of the attachment created by property rules (which,
as we have shown, can be quite strong), will be considered when deciding whether a liability rule
would be more appropriate. They finally dismiss claims about natural entitlements and distributive justice as circular and lacking in conceptual content, respectively. Id. We do not believe that
Kaplow and Shavell have responded to the real point of the behavioralist literature, namely that
individuals might have a preference for property rules qua property rules, and might have a
preference for the status quo qua status quo.
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tioning whether the effect is a preference for property rules over liability rules, or a preference for the status quo.294There are a few writers
of this latter group who believe that individuals exhibit a real preference for property rules, and warn against attempts to "tinker" with it."'
The mainstream academic consensus, however, still tends to favor the
liability rule protection of initial entitlements, which appears to reduce
the endowment
Translating this literature to our concerns, we see that welfare economics has seriously complicated the already puzzled propertylliability
rule puzzle. People's preferences for legal rules (whether informed by
fairness, ownership made venerable by endowment, or even the status
quo) make it difficult to recommend adopting a legal regime that is otherwise believed to be efficient (liability rule protection for most property rights). Moreover, this specific application seems susceptible to
broad generalizations. It therefore makes us wonder when, if ever, welfare economics will be able to boldly call for legal change. The tension
between the status quo and change is omnipresent, as is (to a lesser
extent) the preference creating endowment effect.

D. (Dis)fasfesfor Economic Decision Making
The material in the preceding two sections may not have surprised
the informed reader. The idea that ordinary people prefer fair solutions
to legal problems is obvious. However, welfare economics contains
.within itself an emergent tension to which it may be difficult to res p ~ n d Some
. ~ ~ recent
~
experiments sharply suggest that people may not
want policymakers to use economic, preference-based decision-making
to choose between competing legal practices in their community.
The experiments we will discuss are particularly notable because
they closely simulate actual legal deliberation, and the participants are
specifically asked to assign dollar values. This experimental data is thus
better suited to meet Kaplow and Shavell's strictures than the data of
preferences for procedural justice considered in Part 1I.B. It suggests
294. See Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 280, at 1572-74.
295. Id. at 1575-76;cf. Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Protect Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-olinks, and Other Things That Go Bump
in the Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849, 899, n.219 (2000)(discussing Rachlinski and Jourden).
296. See Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 280,at 1575.
297. A familiar variant of utilitarian theory known as "rule-utilitarianism" attempts to resolve
the practical difficulties of implementing utilitarianism by holding that the analyst's job is simply
to identify the general rule that will tend, on the whole, to maximize welfare to a greater degree
than other competing rules of similar generality. Kaplow and Shave11 frequently express views
similar to rule-utilitarianism. We note, however, that identifying the "best" legal rule under ruleutilitarianism depends in part upon aggregating the net welfare effects of that rule across a range
of individual situations when the rule is likely to be applied. Assessing those individual situations, in turn, may involve the same types of difficult calculations previously discussed.
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that individuals are "actually . . . willing in principle to expend resources to benefit from" law-related preference^.^" People, it seems, do
not like economists to make their legal decisions for them.299 These
preferences, unlike those we have previously discussed, are specifically
concerned with the absence or presence in the legal system of numerical, consequentialist decision-making procedures like the ones supported by Kaplow and Shavell and others. We therefore dub them "antiutilitarian preferences. "
In the following section, we review the works of three prominent
scholars who have performed empirical work teasing out the strength of
anti-utilitarian preferences. Then, in Part III.E, we attempt to explain
when these preferences arise, and articulate why welfare economics
ought to respect them.

I.

W. Kip Viscusi and the Anti- Utilitarian Jury

W. Kip Viscusi is one of the most prominent defenders of economic
decision-making. He believes that "we all benefit" when textbook costbenefit analyses are performed by corporate decision-makers.300He has
argued that regulatory agencies act inefficiently if they do not base their
decisions on such trade off^,^" and that such failures disproportionately
harm racial minorities.302Viscusi strongly encourages legal scholars to
use cost-benefit based decision-making to analyze legal rules and institutions of all kinds.303He thinks individuals perform cost-benefit analy298. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1211.
299. Cf. LEARNED
HAND,THEBILLOF RIGHTS73 (1958). Hand states:
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians,
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in'
charge. I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs.
Id.
300. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act? 52 STAN. L. REV. 547,
550 (2000).
301. See W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U . CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1436-37
(1996) (arguing that agencies should be bound by the "intuitively appealing" "benefit-cost" test).
302. See W. Kip Viscusi. Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGALSTUD. 843 (2000) (arguing that costbenefit decisionmaking by administrative agencies empowers minorities).
303. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in
Environmental and Safery Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998) (applying cost-benefit analysis to
punitive damages); see also W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87
GEO. L.J. 381. 395 (1998) (arguing that legal analyses which do not employ cost-benefit analysis
are not constructive). Cf. W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation:
An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETONHALLL. REV.
1437 (1994) (analyzing intersection of regulation and tort law through cost-benefit lens). See also
W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rarionaliry, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law. 48
RUTGERSL. REV. 625. 667 (1995) (applying cost-benefit analysis to warning label law); cf.
James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Superfund, 16 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 159 (1997) (applying cost-benefit analysis to EPA's Superfund
program).
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ses all the time.304He seems to favor cost-benefit decision-making by
judge^,^" and he also believes that juries should regularly perform costbenefit analyses.306
In light of Viscusi's staunch belief in the desirability of economic
decision-making in the legal system, one of the most striking leitmotifs
in his work is his consistent acknowledgment thateaverage individuals
find cost-benefit analysis in tort cases severely distasteful. Thus, he
offers evidence that others have called his own economic analyses of
safety issues "an offense to human decency."307He recognizes that corporations have had a great deal of trouble articulating their cost-benefit
decision-making persuasively to the publi~.~''Indeed, he has begun to
suspect that individuals have an "ingrained hostility towards rational,
mathematical analyses of benefits and costs in the domain of risk,"309
and argues for framing economic analysis in ways that might ameliorate
this hostility.310
Confronted with this tension, Professor Viscusi decided recently to
test exactly how citizens feel about cost-benefit decision-making in the
legal system.311He asked how potential jurors reacted to corporate risk
balancing when that balancing led to a decision to market a product
containing a defect that had killed someone.312Viscusi presented mock
jurors with five different accident scenarios.313In the first two scenarios, the corporation had performed no cost-benefit analysis, but the cost
304. See Mark K. Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and Consumer Valua.tions of Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J.L. & E c o N . 79 (arguing that consumers
effectively use cost-benefit analysis in making the costlsafety tradeoff while buying a car).
305. W. Kip Viscusi, Regulatory Economics in the Courts: An Analysis of Judge Scalia's
NHTSA Bumper Decision, LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 17 (praising Antonin
Scalia for using cost-benefit decision making while analyzing agency decisions). Viscusi noted
that the "benefit-cost test should be regarded as a tool of advocacy not entirely different from
noneconomic arguments that can be mustered in support of a policy." Id. at 24.
306. Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a
Risk Manager. 40 ARK. L. REV. 901. 913 (1998) ("Ideally, the jury in its role as a risk manager
should promote the rational analyses of risk and safety by the parties who may end up in litigation following adverse events. More specifically, the objective should be to maintain a sensible
benefit-cost tradeoff.")
307. See Viscusi, supra note 300, at 550 n.5 (citing an opposing brief in litigation).
308. See id. at 567-86 (providing examples of companies that performed cost-benefit analyses
being forced to pay large punitive damage awards); see also W. Kip Viscusi, The Governmental
Composition of the Insurance Costs of Smoking, 42 J.L. & ECON. 575, 605 (1999) (asserting that
making cost-benefit arguments is "uncomfortable"); Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, supra note 303, at 321 (asserting
that making such calculations may offend some jurors' sensitivities).
309. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 306, at 913.
310. W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regulation Policies. 3
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 431 (1995) (arguing for a new framework that would allow cost-benefit
decision making to be publicly accepted).
311. See Viscusi, supra note 300 (reporting and analyzing his "juror judgement survey").
312. Viscusi apparently believes that the very existence of a properly performed cost-benefit
analysis should not be evidence of non-negligence. See id. at 550.
313. Id. at 592.
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to make the improvement varied.314In the third and fourth scenarios,
the corporationhad performed an analysis, but employed significantly
different monetary valuations of human life.315In the fifth scenario, the
corporation had made a mistaken calculation while applying various
valuations of life.316
Professor Viscusi found that, even absent a cost-benefit analysis, individuals were willing to punish the company in his hypothetical scenarios with punitive damages in eighty-eight percent of the cases.317
But, in the latter three scenarios, when the analyses had been performed
correctly, individuals were willing to award punitive damages ninetythree to ninety-five percent of the time.318This difference is statistically
~ i g n i f i c a n t , but
~ ' ~ small enough that Viscusi's most interesting results
came from varying the damage estimates employed in the cost-benefit
analyses.
Absent a cost-benefit analysis, individuals imposed an average of
$2.91 million in punitive damages.320But when companies employed
cost-benefit decision-making, they were penalized $4.59 million-fifty
percent more.321Valuing human life at higher numbers only seemed to
increase the juror's ire (a product of a psychological anchoring effect,
Viscusi argue^),^" and incorrect cost-benefit analyses were (counterintuitively) less repellant to jurors than their well-performed counterp a r t ~ Professor
.~~
Viscusi finally compensated for various demographic
and statistical factors represented in his pool of subjects.324He concluded that attempting to justify a legally relevant decision by costbenefit analysis increased the risk of punitive damages by five percent
and the punitive damages awarded by forty-seven per~ent.~"
Professor Viscusi found these results upsetting, to say the least. Although he realizes that "[e]conomic analysis . . . is inherently unpleasant and may offend jurors,"326 he believes that it is a simple "mistaken3" for jurors to punish corporations for their systematic and socially beneficial thinking about risk.328
Id.
Id.
Viscusi, supra note 300, at 592.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 557.
Median value: $1 million. Id. at 557.
Median value: $10 million. Viscusi, supra note 300, at 557.
Id. at 558.
See id. at 559.
Id.
Id.
Viscusi, supra note 300, at 566.
Id. at 586.
See id. at 590.
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It is unclear what Professor Viscusi believes to be the cause of this
aversion to utilitarian thinking. He discusses various biases (including
hindsight bias) that undermine individuals' abilities to think rationally
about risk-benefit decisions after an accident has occurred.329He gives
examples of these biases being applied in a variety of historical trials
that produced large punitive awards.330And yet his results also clearly
demonstrate that citizens exhibit non-random,331coherent preferences
against utilitarian (or "cold-blooded")332decision-making heuristics by
actors in the legal system.333
2.

Cass S u n s t e i n , and the Anti-Utilitarian Law Students

Cass Sunstein is another supporter of cost-benefit based legal decision-making, although his view is more nuanced than Professor Visc ~ s i ' s In
. ~ a~ recent
~
paper,335Sunstein and two co-authors questioned
whether one instance of such decision-making, setting punitive damages
according to a consequentialist model designed by Professors Polinsky
and ~ h a v e 1 1 has
, ~ ~ any
~ support among the citizenry. They concluded
that "the public will be skeptical of an effort" to incorporate the
Polinsky-Shave11 model of optimal deterrence in the legal system and
"[aln attempt to move policy in this direction could be widely perceived
as unfair and wrong. "337
Before arriving at this disheartening (from a welfare economic perspective) conclusion, Sunstein and his co-authors engaged in a series of
.experiments designed to test whether people "believe in optimal deter329. See id. at 586-90. Professor Viscusi is not the only author who believes that cognitive
failures, rather than anti-utilitarian tastes or social norms, are the source of damage awards that
punish cost-benefit analyses. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski. Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn. 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 296303 (1990) (arguing that juries are generally incapable of accurately measuring the marginal
costs and benefits of adding new warnings).
330. See Viscusi, supra note 300, at 567-86.
331. See id. at 586-90.
332. See id.
333. If cognitive biases were the only operative factor, Professor Viscusi's results would not
all point in the same direction. See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously (I). supra
note 123, at 722-25 (noting the indeterminacy of research on the 'direction' or 'tendencies' of
common cognitive biases).
334. Compare Cass R. Sunstein. Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS,supra note 3 (noting that cost-benefit serves as institutional safeguard against popular
prejudice and cognitive biases), with Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U . CHI. L. REV. 636, 642 n.25 (1999) (noting that while most people agree that costbenefit analysis makes sense, its specific definition may either command support or create revulsion). See also Richard H . Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U .
CHI. L. REV. 1. 43-72 (1995) (critiquing conventional cost-benefit analysis for focusing too
narrowly on immediate ends and means).
335. See Sunstein, Schkade, & Kahneman, supra note 5.
336. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 29.
337. Sunstein, Schkade, & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 250.
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rence. "338 According to the Polinsky-Shave11 model, optimal deterrence
occurs when jurors are asked to determine punitive damages by multiplying the inverse of the probability of detection of the tortfeasor's actions by the amount of the compensatory award that would compensate
the victim's loss.339
Plainly the "optimal deterrence" model of punitive damages is a
utilitarian, cost-benefit based decision heuristic. The Polinsky-Shave11
article notes that punitive damages are also used to further the aim of
punishment, but its analysis largely omits that aim.340Polinsky and
Shavell conceive of the aim of punishment as promoting "the pleasure
or satisfaction people obtain from seeing blameworthy parties puni~hed"~
or~the
' satisfaction of "an abstract philosophical principle calling for retribution."342Both of these goods are similar to the "tastes for
fairness" that serve as a brake on welfare analysis in the monograph of
Kaplow and Shavell. In a sense, the pure optimal deterrence model derived from the work of Polinsky and Shavell may be thought of as an
attempt to conceptualize a role for punitive damages to serve in the absence of tastes for fairness.
To investigate the acceptability of this model, Sunstein and his coauthors performed two experiments.343In the first, they asked 699 citizens to judge mock personal injury cases and determine whether the
probability of detection of the tortious conduct should affect the damage
award.344The likelihood that the wrongdoer would be caught was varied
from twenty percent, to ten percent, to one percent in different samp l e ~ . ~Their
~ ' basic result was "striking and simple."346Even varying
the probability of detection by twenty-fold had no significant effect on
the amount of the punitive award the would-be jurors offered.347Indeed,
the effect went in an opposite direction-greater probabilities of detection engendered larger
However, the authors acknowledge that their initial study subjects
may not have been sufficiently exposed to, or educated about, the value
of cost-benefit thinking.349They therefore turned to a new pool of subjects, closer to home, who would seemingly be uniquely willing and
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id. at 239; see Polinsky & Shavell. supra note 29.
Id. at 238.
Polinsky & Shavell. supra note 29.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 948 n.252.
Sunstein. Schkade, & Kahneman. supra note 5. at 239-40.
Id. at 241-43.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 243.
Id.
Sunstein. Schkade. & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 243-44.
Id. at 244.
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able to apply utilitarian decision-making in legal settings-second-year
and third-year law students at the University of Chicago.350
The study asked whether, in two different fact situations, a specifi~'
cally articulated optimal deterrence policy was a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ~Sunstein
and his co-authors sadly report that even the law students, by very
strong majorities,352rejected policies that maximized deterrence. Moreover, most of the law students believed that the rest of society would
agree with them.353Sunstein and his co-authors conclude that "[tlhe fact
that optimal deterrence policies are rejected in both the administrative
and the judicial domains among a group likely to be predisposed in
their favor strongly suggests that any effort to move in the direction of
optimal deterrence would encounter significant popular resistance. "354
They argue that this result confirms "messy" real world evidence tending to show that "juries do not pursue optimal deterrence. "355
Without this study, it would be possible to imagine that the rejection of optimal deterrence by juries arises from their cognitive biases
and general irrationality, rather than a substantive view of what the
legal system should be.356However, even University of Chicago law
students, conditioned and requested to apply the use of this form of
cost-benefit decision-making to hypothetical tort disputes, refused by
overwhelming margins. Sunstein and his co-authors thus conclude that
reforming the legal system to optimize deterrence faces severe hurdles.
Juries may nullify their instructions.357Individuals will widely perceive
policies to be "unfair and wrong."358In a remarkable passage, Sunstein
and co-authors speculate that the government may need to adopt various
paternalistic policies if it wishes to pursue normative proposals based
on optimal deterrence. Government may need to conceal its true decision-making norm from citizens,359re-educate them about its wisdom,360
350. Id. "University of Chicago Law School students generally learn a great deal about deterrence theory in their first year of law school . . . [this] training . . . alerts [them of the need] to
consider both level and probability of penalty in achieving optimal deterrence." Id.
351. Students were given a recommendation that they should apply optimal deterrence decision making, and asked whether they strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, or
strongly disagreed with the statement. Id. at 245.
352. Sunstein, Schkade, & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 246. Optimal deterrence policies were
rejected by eighty-four percent of the law students in one setting and seventy-five percent in
another.
353. Sixty-seven to eighty-seven percent thought that "most people" would reject the optimal
deterrence approach. Id. at 246.
354. Id. at 248.
355. Id. at 249.
356. Cf. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra
note 3, at 223.
357. See Sunstein, Schkade, and Kahneman, supra note 5, at 250.
358. Id.
359. See id. For a longer discussion of this option, see infra Part 1II.A.
360. See Sustein, Schkade, & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 250.
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confine optimal-deterrence decision making to limited contexts,361 or
. ~would
~ ~ seem
shift authority from the legal system to b u r e a u ~ r a c i e s It
that only by shifting power from the people can the government be free.
Then, "whatever ordinary people think, the relevant administrators will
seek to promote optimal deterrence. "363

3.

W. Kip Viscusi Returns with Yet More Bad News

Professor Viscusi has recently responded to Sunstein's antideterrence paper with an empirical study of his own3@Although he
describes the experiments by Sunstein and others as "carefully controlled,"3G he nevertheless believes that they did not test citizens' willingness to apply utilitarian reasoning with enough specificity. He therefore devised an experiment directly testing whether individuals would
apply the Polinsky-Shave11 punitive damages
Viscusi instructed individuals to perform three calculations before
selecting a punitive damage award. First, they were instructed to set the
award that would be appropriate from a pure deterrence perspective.
That number, they were told, should equal the level of damages (the
compensatory judgment) divided by the probability of detection.367Second, they were told to think about what level of damages was necessary
to punish corporate wrongdoing,368but were instructed that such punishment may occur through the compensatory (and not the punitive)
damage scheme.369Third, they were told to compute a weighted average
of the first two numbers to find the optimal punitive award. In Viscusi's
view, this "precise guide" should have corrected for various cognitive
biases that affect
Viscusi predicted that his step-by-step damages-setting procedure would reduce punitive damages
Professor Viscusi gave each model jury these instructions, and then
one of five factual scenario^.^" The scenarios were designed to vary the
amount of the concealment of wrongdoing by the corporate tortfeasors,
and the corresponding likelihood that the tortious conduct would be
dete~ted.~"Viscusi also tried to alter the anchoring effects created by
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

See id.
See id.
Id. We discuss this solution infra Part 1II.B.
See Viscusi. supra note 4.
Id. at 314.
These instructions appear in an appendix to Viscusi's paper. See id. at 344-46.
See Polinsky & Shavell. supra note 29. at 889 (describing the procedure).
A notion with no counterpart in consequentialist legal theories.
See Viscusi. supra note 4. at 345.
See id. at 318-19.
See id.
Id. at 346-49.
In some cases the tortfeasors openly poisoned the environment, knowing that seventy-
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party attorneys or external sources, hoping to determine whether the
Polinsky-Shave11 optimal-deterrence proposal is
The results were discouraging. Viscusi found that, on average, only
fifteen percent of respondents would correctly apply the PolinskyShavell calculus.375 "Quite simply," he says, individuals "ignore the
guidance of the deterrence table and [do not take] into account the differing value of the detection probability when setting the optimal deterrence amount."376 The amount of money that individuals believed necessary to punish corporations proved far more significant to determining the amount of their final damage award than did their view of the
deterrence test.3n
Viscusi proposes two different explanations for his results. First, he
suggests that low education may have prevented some juries from being
able to make the necessary deterrence calculations.378This dovetails
with Viscusi's conclusions in earlier work about the effect of cognitive
biases on the ability of individuals to measure risk.379However, Viscusi
concludes that education alone does not explain individuals' unwillingness or inability to apply the utilitarian formula offered to them. In
fact, the responses differed significantly among ethnic and gender lines:
minority status and gender were the two most significant determinants
of whether an individual would apply the instructions.380Sixty-two percent of those giving incorrect or missing answers were female.381Simply being a woman apparently makes you five percent less likely to
apply Polinsky's and Shavell's utilitarian deterrence formula.382Suggestively, Professor Viscusi concludes that while this failure may reflect
lower mathematical skills among women, it may also reflect "a greater
reluctance by female respondents to surrender their punitive damages
judgment to a mathematical formula. "383
Members of minority groups were even more hostile to the
Polinsky-Shave11 formula. Black respondents were eleven percent less
likely than whites to give the "correct" deterrence maximizing
Hispanic respondents also rejected Polinsky and Shavell at a rate eight
five percent of the time they would not be caught; in other cases they did so at midnight. See id.
at 320-21.
374. See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 319.
375. See id. at 326.
376. Id. at 329.
377. See id. at 333.
378. See id. at 338.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 348-349.
380. See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 338.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
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percent higher than whites.385
Thus, two characteristics: being educated, and being a white male,
were the only ones positively correlated with a willingness to apply a
pure deterrence formula in a toxic tort case. In light of this study, Viscusi concludes that attempts to reform tort damages will fail as long as
individual citizens retain control over the process.386He echoes his earlier call for removing legal cases from the hands of citizens, who are
"simply reluctant or unable to carry out even the most basic mathematical calculations. "387
Sunstein's and Viscusi's research implies that Polinsky's and Shavell's optimal deterrence model of tort damages provokes fierce distaste
among those exposed to it, to the point of prompting widespread nullification and disobedience. To revert to our prior metaphor, it is clear
that law-related preferences will act as a powerful stumbling block to
any attempt to implement such a policy in a jury system: the jurors will
not obey.388The results of Sunstein's survey of law students suggests
that even bureaucrats may defect.
What about the direct welfare effects of such a policy? That is, suppose that the Polinsky-Shave11 damages model is welfare-maximizing in
allocative terms. Suppose further that someone can be found to implement it (which seems doubtful). Then to what degree will the frustration of the law-related preferences disclosed by the two studies act as a
"brake" on the welfare gains associated with the policy? Again, unless
one dogmatically excludes as irrelevant all preference information that
is not readily monetized, the reality of the preferences disclosed in the
punitive damages studies is clear, especially as results of social science
research go. On the other hand, their magnitude is totally unclear.
Economists who urge the need for tort reform rightly point out the huge
dollar values involved in punitive damage awards: if these awards are
consistently wrong from the standpoint of welfare (excluding lawrelated preferences), and the losses do not somehow cancel each other
out, then the welfare loss produced is likely to be very serious. Such
losses would be serious enough to swamp even large welfare gains that
resulted from respecting the desires of average people for a nonutilitarian, fairness-based system of assigning punitive damages. The
385. See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 338.
386. See id. at 344.
387. Id. This statement is not entirely supported by the rest of Professor Viscusi's paper.
Individuals were able to average the amounts they awarded for deterrence and those they
awarded for punishment. In over seventy-five percent of the cases, they did so correctly. See id.
at 326. That suggests that, as with (presumably) the Chicago law students, the salient trait of
Viscusi's non-lawyer subjects was not an inability to compute, but rather a reluctance to choose
an amount that would correlate to the mathematically determined optimal deterrence number.
Indeed. Viscusi acknowledges this possibility himself. See id. at 338-39.
388. See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 326.

404

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 53:2:335

answer must await more empirical inquiry. One crucial consideration
will be determining whether these preferences are produced, and hence
satisfied or frustrated, only when individuals are in a jury room, or
otherwise directly exposed to the workings of the tort system, or
whether a more widespread disappointment would be involved. Again,
we discuss this limitation in Part 1I.E below.
A second important question that remains open about these studies
is whether other welfare-economic proposals for reforming tort damages will produce the same negative reactions that the optimaldeterrence model does. The vehemence may simply reflect a flaw in
Polinsky's and Shavell's model. That model seems custom-designed to
inflame law-related preferences and tastes for fairness in general to a
high degree, especially when presented in a "pure" form that does not
permit juries to assign damages for punishment. (Recall that Polinsky
and Shavell's model instructions do authorize the jury to punish.)389The
model first tells jurors to assess "punitive damages," and then orders
them to apply a procedure that seems to flout or ignore the fairnessbased and retributive norms that distinguish punitive damages from
normal tort damages. For example, the welfare losses from simply
abolishing punitive damages, ordering juries merely to compensate,
might be smaller, and might provoke less nullification. Or maybe not.
Again, this question is open for future study.
4.

Jonathan Baron, and the Need for Education

Psychologist Jonathan Baron's research concentrates on the "everyday intuitions that stand in the way of utility maximization, particularly
moral intuitions. "390 Baron believes that consequentialism should be
preferred as a decision heuristic over intuitive alternatives such as
common notions of fairness.391However, much of his scholarship is
dedicated to identifying, then confronting, deeply felt individual intuitions and tastes against utilitarianism. His thesis is simple:
"[u]tilitarianism often conflicts with our intuitive beliefs about what is
morally right. "392 Baron's research identifies anti-utilitarian dispositions
that seem to pose a powerful "stumbling blockw3" almost anytime individuals are asked to apply consequentialist legal principles or policies.
In Baron's view, the basic moral norm that seems to prevent indi389. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 29, at 889 (describing the procedure).
390. Jonathan Baron, Research, Books, Papers, available at http:llwww.sas.upenn.eduljbaronlpprs.htrn1 (last visited Mar. 24. 2001).
SCI. 1 (1994).
391. Jonathan Baron, Nonconsequentialist Decisions, 17 BEHAV.& BRAIN
392. See Jonathan Baron. Heuristics and Biases in Equity Judgments, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
109, 111 (Mellers & Baron eds., 1993).
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE
393. See Viscusi. supra note 4. at 326.
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viduals from embracing utilitarianism can be simply stated: "Do No
Harm."394Thus, Baron asked individuals whether they would (as policy
makers) recommend widespread vaccinations, given that the vaccination
would have both harmful and helpful effects. He found that individuals
were reluctant to maximize the benefits to society by recommending the
vaccine. They preferred to allow harm to occur by omission rather than
to cause a smaller magnitude of harm by commission.3gs Similarly,
Baron has found that individuals exhibited tastes against welfarejustified trade treaties when they cost real people their jobs.396This bias
"toward inaction"397is similar to the status quo bias discussed above,398
and may derive from the same intuitive moral judgment.
Second, like Sunstein and Viscusi, Baron has found a dispiriting
lack of willingness among members of the public to apply deterrencebased utilitarian decision procedures in common criminal, administrative, and tort settings. Thus, Baron found that individuals imposed
roughly the same penalties on a given course of conduct regardless of
whether they were told that imposing a penalty would cease harmful
future conduct, or that it would prevent beneficial activity.3* In a related experiment, individuals were actually given express, consequentialist arguments for deterrence before being asked to determine penalties in a hypothetical situation. Again, about half of the subjects explicitly rejected consequentialist r e a s ~ n i n g .Individuals
~~
simply believe
that the legal system should be focused on the moral characteristics of
the situation here and now: "consequences of a past action . . . should
not be judged based on its ramifications for future actions/deci~ions."~~
Citizens commonly reject utilitarianism by contrasting it to the just or
fair result: "Either the company is to blame or it isn't," in the words of
one of Baron's model jurors.402
This anti-deterrence preference is related to another phenomenon
that appears in Baron's work; a general distaste for coercive utilitarian394. For a fascinating example of how the "Do No Harm" principle can conflict with legal
rules, see Catherine Elliott, Murder and Necessity Following the Siamese Twins Litigation, 65 J.
CRIM. L. 66 (2001) (describing how parents of conjoined twins refused to harm one of the pair
by agreeing to a separation that would save the other, and examining the legal proceedings by
which the state eventually compelled the operation).
395. See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity. 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING263 (1990). Ritov and Baron conclude that, "subjects are
reluctant to vaccinate when the vaccine can cause bad outcomes, even if the outcomes of not
vaccinating are worse." Id. at 275.
396. See BARON,supra note 6, at 97-103.
397. See Baron, supra note 392, at 129.
398. See supra notes 237-245 and accompanying text.
399. See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions about Penalties and Compensation in the
17 (1993).
Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
rn. BARON, supra note 6, at 123.
401. Id.
402. Id.
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ism. Thus, individuals disfavor imposing taxes based on a cost-benefit
analysis of their effect on behavior, because, such policies impose utilitarianism on the publi~.""~
Subjects reject reforms like abolishing political advertising, eliminating medical malpractice suits, and a one hundred percent tax on gasoline, even when they know the benefits of such
policies outweigh the costs, because to do otherwise would disadvantage
some part of society through an imposed economic calculus.404Baron
tastes for personal autonomy that might
warns that it is our "~ishfU1""~~
motivate this anti-coercive "rule of thumb."406 He discounts the rightness (though not the strength) of the beliefs of those individuals who
dislike having their "rights" trumped by "bureaucratic games. "407
Finally, Professor Baron has sketched out some evidence for a type
of anti-utilitarianism taste that is not simply negative: a positive taste
for equality and deontological thinking.408Thus, individuals wish for
decisions about the environment to be made through deontological
thinking, not utilitarian balan~ing.~"Baron later modified his vaccination experiment and found that even after factoring out the status quo
bias, individuals exhibit a positive taste for equality-at the expense of
efficiency-when deciding between competing social programs.410
Baron believes that these intuitions stand squarely in the path of a
society enriched by the fruits of utilitarian thinking. He recommends a
variety of ways "around" these tastes. These proposed solutions range
from a rejection of cynicism about g~vernment,~"
to a new kind of politics itselC4l2from a different kind of national press,413to a newly accu-

403. See id. at 54-56 (noting that resistance is in part an anti-coercive norm and in part a
disbelief in the elasticity of behavior); see also Jonathan Baron & James Jurney. Norms Against
Voting for Coerced Reform. 64 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 347 (1993).
404. See Baron. supra note 392. at 130-31.
405. See BARON,supra note 6. at 29-30.
406. Id. at 142; see id. at 29, 30, 53, 142, 163.
407. Id. at 29.
408. Deontological moral thinking is the opposite of consequentialist thinking. Deontological
views hold that the moral goodness or badness of an action depends, not upon the consequences
of that action, but rather upon a direct relationship between the actor, her actions, andlor the
immediate situation in which the action takes place.
409. Jonathan Baron, Deontological vs. Utilitarian Values for Natural Resources, available at
http:llwww.sas.upenn.edul-jbaronlenv.htm1 (last visited Mar. 23, 2001).
410. Baron asked his subjects to choose between vaccinating and not vaccinating two groups
(boys and girls), and found that even when there was no status quo effect, individuals exhibited
significant negative reactions to decisions that would produce unequal results, even when they
programs would maximize overall benefits in society. Baron, supra note 392, at 132-34.
411. See BARON, supra note 6. at 185-87 (calling for individuals to trust the government to
perform accurate cost-benefit analyses).
412. See id. at 194-95 (calling for the government to fund politicians who present cost-benefit
based solutions to national problems).
413. See id. at 193-94 (calling for reporters to focus on the empirical consequences of policy
decisions, and not the public's reaction).

20021

Law and Economics

407

rate and omniscient Internet.414Indeed, should such narrow solutions
not pan out, Baron is driven to advocate truly radical reforms to enable
the new utilitarian era, including new kinds of ~arenting,~"
or comprehensive proposals to re-educate our children so that they become aware
of the wisdom of the welfare economic project.416

E. The Possible Scope of Anti-Utilitarian and Other LawRelated Preferences
The evidence of law-related preferences considered here leaves two
major issues open. The first, as we have discussed repeatedly, is the
absence of numerical values. If an individual is confronted with a legal
policy or institution about which he holds law-related preferences or
tastes for fairness, how do we measure what he is likely to give up in
order to satisfjl that preference? We have endorsed the need for more
refined investigation here, though the inability to assign dollar values to
these preferences does not justify complacency about their effects.
But there is a second important issue. It is plausible that many legal
rules and institutions do not give rise to significant law-related preferences because individuals simply do not know about them. There is
strong empirical evidence that most individuals subject to the law do
not actually know what it is.417Even if individuals have a general sense
of a legal rule, they may not understand how it is applied.418The idea
that non-lawyers might have real preferences about the law and its procedures can seem counterintuitive. After all, the timely, costly ritual of
law school exists to indoctrinate lawyers to know the law's distinctions
in a way that the general public does not.
414. See id. at 199-200 (arguing that Internet chat rooms have restored a "premium on facts
and figures that concern expected consequencesn).
415. See id. at 201 (suggesting that parents ensure that their children understand social and
moral theory by buying them world-building computer games like Sim Earth and Sim City).
416. See BARON, supra note 6, at 196-99 (calling for education starting in elementary school
about utilitarian thinking); see also Baron, supra note 392, at 135 (noting that "people should be
taught to understand the utilitarian approachn).
417. See, e.g.. Martha Williams & Jay Hall, Knowledge of the Law in Texas: Socioeconomic
and Ethnic Differences. 7 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 99 (1972) (discussing interviewers' findings that
while legal knowledge varied with socio-economic status, even wealthy individuals did not know
a large proportion of relevant private law); see also Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The
Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L.
REV. 893 (1982) (asserting that patients did not know that their confidences had legal protection).
418. See ELLICKSON, supra note 276, at 48-53, 137-55 (while interested parties may understand the law in a general way, this knowledge does not incorporate the specific implications of
rules like strict liability); cf. Pauline D. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U . ILL. L. REV. 447 (1999) (asserting that workers'
misunderstanding of how the law is applied is based on their confusion of social norms and legal
rules); see also Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3. at 1352.
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Paradoxically, even as Sunstein, Viscusi, and Baron are uncovering
pronounced discontent among model tort juries with the application of
quantitative cost-benefit procedures, federal agencies in Washington are
blithely formulating binding regulations with the aid of cost-benefit
analysis, as they have done for the past twenty years. This has been
standard procedure for agencies developing major regulations since the
issuance of a presidential Executive Order early in President Reagan's
administrati~n.~"
The Reagan order imposed a fairly rigid requirement
that all major regulations be justified by a (textbook) cost-benefit analysis. It was supplanted during the Clinton presidency by Executive Order
12,866, the current cost-benefit analysis order.420 Order 12,866 still
gives cost-benefit analysis a central role in the formulation of regulatory policy, though it also gives the agencies more freedom to deviate
from textbook cost-benefit analysis by including distributional weights,
existence values, and the like.421Legal academics have engaged in a
lively controversy over the policy of requiring agency cost-benefit
analysis, but evidence of any popular outcry over the requirement is
scarce. As far as we can tell, a large portion of the federal law-making
apparatus has been yoked to economic norms without causing significant outrage to law-related preferences or other tastes for fairness.
Yet this is not from a lack of popular interest in the legal system.
The United States has often been described as a uniquely law-obsessed
society: "a vast, bustling school of law," in the words of a contemporary observer.422The law, its procedures, and even some of its technicalities are constantly on display (sometimes in palpably inaccurate
forms) in television, movies, and book^.^"
We are unsure how to synthesize these seemingly contradictory
data. If forced to speculate, we would suggest that regulatory policy
makes neither good drama nor gripping news, and that scholarly articles debating its moral correctness are unread by all but a handful of
Americans. Ignorance of the law may be no excuse, but it is a reality:
utilitarians only outrage those who know about them.
419. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). revoked by Exec. Order No. 12.866,
3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
420. Exec. Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
421. Id. President George W. Bush, in turn, has appointed personnel to the White House
Office of Management and Budget (the office which oversees the agency regulatory process) who
support a more restrictive implementation of the cost-benefit analysis requirement. So far the
rigidity (or rigor) of agency cost-benefit analysis seems to be greater under Republican presidents, lower under Democratic ones. See Cindy Skrzycki, OMB Chief Vows Scrutiny ofdgencies:
Daniels Wants Consultation With States on Major Rules, WASH. POST, May 25, 2001, at E3.
422. MARYANN GLENDON. A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISISI N THE LEGAL
IS TRANSFORMING
AMERICAN
SOCIETY258 & n.3 (1994) (paraphrasing Lawrence
PROFESSION
Friedman, Law. Lawyers and Popular Culture, 98 YALEL.J. 1579, 1598 (1989)).
423. See generally id., ch. 12.
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111. CANA PREFERENCE-BASED
LEGALPOLICY CO-EXIST WITH
DEMOCRACY?
We return to our guiding question: in light of improved empirical
information, what is required for economic analysts to put the moral
commitment to maximize well-being into practice? In this final part we
summarize the problems that our analysis has raised and briefly discuss
several possible responses to them.
A.

Problems Conjronting Normative Law and Economics

1. Developing Improved Practical Techniques to Measure

Welfare
We argued in Part I that despite years of scholarly effort, the
distortions caused by wealth effects still pose a serious problem for
legal economists. The new normative analysts are careful to stress the
ways that their moral positions differ from wealth maximization; this is
one of the qualities that makes their moral positions potentially attractive as bases for reform. Yet they admit that there are no consistent,
practical methods for disentangling preference strength from wealth,
which is necessary to maximize welfare. This perennial headache of
welfare economics shows no sign of easing soon.
Our discussion of citizens' preferences about the legal system in
Part I1 suggests another reason that improved practical techniques are
important. Analysts like Kaplow and Shavell, who are committed to
incorporating all actual preferences into the welfare calculus, must find
ways to assign welfare values to preferences that are difficult to assign
market prices. At present, polls, surveys, psychological experiments
and the like are the chief tools for investigating such preferences. Analysts may seek to reject some of these hard-to-price preferences "on the
merits" as morally irrelevant. They may also decide (if evidence permits) that these preferences are of negligible strength, and so can be
ignored. But there are limits to the extent to which analysts can simply
reject evidence of such preferences out of hand on methodological
grounds, because of its form, and still claim to be concerned with
maximizing welfare. The evidence of law-related preferences discussed
in Part I1 may fall into this category.
2.

Law-Related Preferences as Components of Welfare

If some preferences about the content and fairness of the legal system are significant enough to alter the outcome of economic analysis,
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then fixing their limits will be important. The question seems wide
open: which legal practices are strongly valued? For example, are
popular preferences more intense with respect to the law of prostitution
than the law of personal bankruptcy? By how much? If potentially large
values go unmeasured, then rules that may be welfare-maximizing in
other respects (allocatively efficient with respect to material goods,
creating proper incentives, distributively neutral, etc.) may not in fact
be welfare-maximizing. Or they simply may not be as big an improvement as they seem. Perhaps further research will show that law-related
preferences have low welfare effects. But our claim, based on the evidence in Part 11, is that the answer cannot simply be derived from intuition.
3.

Law-Related Preferences as Influences on the Behavior of
Legal Actors

Drawing on research by Baron, Sunstein, Viscusi, and others, Part
I1 presented direct evidence that law-related preferences sometimes
cause ordinary people to act in ways that make legal institutions deviate
from the goals of welfare economists. Some analysts are still inclined to
explain these phenomena as reflecting irrational cognitive biases-and
this may be true at times. But Sunstein, Viscusi, and Baron all concede
that the most natural explanation of their research is not irrationality,
but a consistent, strongly held moral reaction to economic thinking.
People asked to apply economically grounded procedures to legal or
policy scenarios sometimes refuse for moral or personal reasons, nullifying their instructions because they are offended by the procedures.
Even well-educated law students appear to share this revulsion, which
leads one to think it may affect politicians and judges as well as jurors.
This revulsion could also affect political behavior such as voting. These
possibilities alone make clear that law-related preferences have important policy ramifications.
Again, open (and intriguing) empirical questions remain about the
scope of law-related preferences. What is definite is that analysts have
begun to take the problem seriously enough to speculate about responses.

B. Hiding the Ball: Secrecy as a Response to LawRelated Preferences
I.

Possible Policies of Secrecy

Kaplow and Shave11 concede that "there will sometimes be a sig-
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nificant conflict between the policy that decision-makers, based on advice from legal policy analysts, understand to be best and the policy
that ordinary citizens think is fair."424They recognize that there may be
a need for judges (among other actors) to resort to the "language of
fairness" in explaining the basis of their decisions.425In other words:
not only do people want certain outcomes, but people want the choices
that created those outcomes to be non-utilitarian ones. Similarly, Sunstein and his co-authors note that secrecy is a possible response to the
data showing that individuals sharply reject the type of thinking embodied in the optimal-deterrence
Kaplow and Shavell are somewhat coy about the form secrecy
should take. They state that government decision-makers ought to continue receiving "good advice" from the scholarly community. This
good advice should consist of welfare maximizing analyses. The two
professors are less clear about what judges should do with this advice
when they. receive it-Fairness Versus Welfare is a piece whose intended audience is scholars, not judge^.^" However, they suggest that
judges might consider hiding the true bases of their decisions by employing a code-the language of fairness-which will placate the
The authors note that such a policy would be easy to employ because judges could employ notions of fairness to support almost any
policy choice.429They go on to suggest that such coding might be unnecessary in any event. At present, they argue, the "masses" don't read
court opinions, lawyers and other elites do.430 Elites, presumably,
would be able to appreciate and approve of the complexities of welfare
economics.
Finally, though, Kaplow and Shavell recognize that government decision-makers are to some degree accountable to ordinary citizens, and
they squarely confront the possibility that citizens might personally dislike both the bases and the results of welfare economic decisionmaking. They respond that citizens might nevertheless accept a welfareeconomic legal system as a matter of principle, because they might wish
their rulers to base their decisions on methods of moral reasoning alien
to their own. Kaplow and Shavell do not offer any empirical support for
this prop~sition.~~'
TO render it plausible, they argue that the prospect
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.

Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1320.
Id. at 1319-20.
See Sunstein. Schkade. and Kahneman. supra note 5, at 250.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1321.
See id. at 1319.

Id.
See id. at 1319 n.869.
See id. at 1322-23.
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of using welfare economics to reshape the legal system does not raise
any special moral or political issues. Instead, it is an example of a quite
general tendency. It is common in many walks of life, the two authors
reason, for experts' advice to suggest different results than the beliefs
of ordinary
And there is usually little popular discontent
about such divergences; after all, that is what experts are for. Why,
then, should a legal system whose substance and procedures are based
on expert economic advice be regarded any differently?
This argument is confused. The examples of specialized advice that
Kaplow and Shavell mention all have to do with the knowledge possessed by technical experts (one of their examples is safety engineers).
Individuals may indeed be relatively comfortable surrendering their
judgment on technical issues to certified experts, but it is not at all
clear that most people believe that credentialed professionals are entitled to their deference in moral matters-and the type of expert advice
Kaplow and Shavell propose to give is moral. It is reasonable to assume
that popular disagreement with experts about the proper moral basis of
the legal system will be of a different kind, and far more strongly held,
than disagreement with experts about the fine points of hydroelectric
turbine design. And to the extent that such disagreements are strongly
held, Kaplow and Shavell must take them into account, both as components of welfare and as behavioral influences on legal actors.433

432. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1323.
433. The philosopher Bernard Williams has observed that many utilitarian ethical theories
imply a division between "a class of theorists who can responsibly handle the utilitarian justification of non-utilitarian dispositions, the other a class who unreflectively deploy[s] those dispositions." BERNARDWILLIAMS, ETHICS A N D THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 108 (1985). AS Williams
notes, the great utilitarian theorist Henry Sidgwick confronted such a problem near the end of the
nineteenth century in his chief philosophical work, The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick feared that.
while utilitarianism was true, widespread dissemination of that truth might not promote human
welfare. In light of utilitarianism, that implied that disseminating it would be morally wrong.
Attempting to inculcate utilitarian attitudes in normal citizens might "do more harm by weakening current morality than good by improving its quality." HENRY SIDGWICK, T H E METHODSO F
ETHICS 489-90(7th ed. 1907) (1874); see also BERNARD WILLIAMS. ETHICS A N D THE LIMITS OF

PHILOSOPHY
109 (1985).
Sidgwick therefore inclined to the view that utilitarian theorists should carefully limit the
publicity that they gave to their ethical views. Similarly, today improved empirical information
seems to be driving Kaplow and Shavell to consider limiting the number of citizens who learn
that utilitarian norms are at work in the legal system. Sidgwick mused:
[O]n Utilitarian principles, it may be right to do and privately recommend, under
certain circumstances, what it would not be right to advocate openly; it may be
right to teach openly to one set of persons what it would be wrong to teach to others; it may be conceivably right to do, if it can be done with comparative secrecy,
what it would be wrong to do in the face of the world.
Id. at 109.
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Problems with Secrecy

We foresee three objections to a legal regime bent on hiding the decision-making technique from the people. First, it is possible that the
people will uncover the man behind the curtain. To the extent that Kaplow and Shave11 propose that a broad class of actors hides its real motivations (the judges), while a smaller class of actors actively explores
the real principles of decision (scholars), it is likely that someone,
sometime, will let the cat out of the bag. Indeed, complete secrecy is
unrealistic. Rather, welfare economists would have to hope that a regime of mixed secrecy will suffice, whereby the real norms of decision
are translated into "fairness" terms, but the public is generally aware
that more complicated economic analyses underlie these decisions.
However, it is unclear that even a mixed secrecy regime could cohere
for long. For example, scholars hostile to the practical or moral foundations of the welfare project might attempt to write descriptive pieces
in mainstream publications, seizing on particularly salient examples that
pit welfare solutions against fairness norms.434
Second, hiding the moral bases of legal policies from the people affected by them may be morally objectionable in itself. Analysts who
were previously inclined to exclude some preferences from the concept
of well-being on ethical grounds may feel uneasy about supporting a
system that is accepted, and promotes well-being, only because its nature is not generally known. Thus, as Adler and Posner observe, it is
philosophically plausible to argue that preferences premised on a seriously mistaken understanding of reality should not be included in the
concept of well-being. They give the example of a researcher who carries on a happy and productive scientific career, and regards his past
professional activity with great satisfaction.435Unbeknownst to the researcher, his government has clandestinely funneled his scientific work
into "a secret weapons program" that would horrify him if he knew
about it.436In such a case, it might be wrong to view the researcher's
career as having improved his well-being, even though he, in his ignorance, remains fully satisfied. Analogously, if a reformed legal system
brought great tangible benefits to citizens, but was secretly based on
procedures and ideas of which the citizens would seriously disapprove
(if only they knew), it may be difficult to say that the system is normatively desirable.
In addition, special moral and ethical problems may arise if academ434. We find this project tempting.
435. Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 203.
436. Id. The premise that the researcher would strongly disapprove of the project is implicit
in Adler and Posner's presentation.
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ics become involved in policies that involve deliberate concealment of
the norms underlying the legal system. The social norms of openness
and transparency are important characteristics of academic culture, and
we are skeptical that academics would be open to such a significant
change in that culture.

C. Giving the Ball to Bureaucrats: Regulatory Responses to AntiUtilitarian Preferences
A second solution to the problem of anti-utilitarianism has been adverted to several times in the text above: remove power from populist
decision-makers. Professors Baron, Viscusi, and Sunstein are all, to
some degree, tempted to transfer the authority to implement legal policies from democratic common law institutions to government bureaucracies.
Sunstein is the most explicit regulator of the three scholars. His
failure to convince University of Chicago law students to maximize
what he saw as social welfare has left him shaken. In his article's conclusion, Sunstein argues that simply hiding decision-making norms
from the populace, as Kaplow and Shave11 appear to endorse, will be
insufficient. A better solution would be to remove power to unelected
(and insulated) bureaucrats, who will maximize welfare in the face of
contrary individual preference^.^^'
Viscusi similarly suggests a vast reduction in the power of judges
and juries to regulate corporate decisions on product and environmental
safety.438Corporations, he seems to be saying, will either self-regulate
(through the cost-benefit mechanism) or be subject to partial regulation
by the government (possibly to keep these cost-benefit analyses honest) .439
The radical and paternalistic qualities of these proposals are indirect
evidence of the strength of the anti-utilitarian preference among the
general public. However, we will sound a note of doubt about the practicality of the "regulatory" solution of Sunstein, Viscusi, and Baron.
First, as a matter of politics, it is a complicated question whether the
majority will acquiesce to being deprived of the ability to make the hard
choices about political goods. (We decline to address that question
here.) But even to the extent that "ordinary individuals" remain unin437. Id.; see also Jolls et al., supra note 139, at 48-49 (suggesting that a stronger bureaucracy might be better than a "populist governmentn at avoiding the bad consequences of what they
see as irrational choices, and concluding that the question of whether this is a wise policy should
be answered empirically, and not morally or philosophically).
438. Viscusi, The Social Cost of Punitive Damages against Corporations in Environmental
and Safety Torts. supra note 303, at 335-36.
439. Id.

20021

Law and Economics

415

formed about bureaucratic decisions, individuals adversely affected by
bureaucratic decisions will constantly push to return them to the public
sphere, where their influence might be better heard.440But even if this
were not so, and we could somehow tie ourselves to the mast of a
purely regulatory state, we believe that bureaucrats are people too. Indeed, many of them may have once been Professor Sunstein's law students, or Professor Baron's anti-utilitarian undergraduates. The point is
that there is little evidence, as Professor Sunstein himself admits, that
bureaucrats overseeing tort or environmental disputes with serious fairness dimensions will do what efficiency requires when it conflicts with
their own moral belief^.^' It is more likely that pushing power from the
legal system to the government will simply discount the preferences of
the majority of the people while substituting the preferences of the few,
and it may substitute the biases of elites for the choices of a broader
cross-section of the nation.

D. See Spot Run, See Spot Jump, See Spot PerjGorm the Welfare
Calculus: Re-Education as a Response to
Anti-Utilitarian Preferences
A third possible solution to the problem of anti-utilitarianism is reeducation. People's preferences can sometimes be changed by being
taught to prefer something else. One after the other, many of the authors discussed in this Article have broached the idea that the government should teach citizens enough about utilitarianism to make consequentialist legal decision-making palatable.442Baron considers this idea
in the most detail, so we briefly present his ideas as an example of what
such a re-education program might look like.
Baron argues that all citizens should be taught that their sincerely
held moral intuitions will sometimes run contrary to proper, utilitarian,
social practice^.^^ In order to teach citizens to distrust their moral intuitions, Baron argues for a multi-level, multi-year commitment. On the
home front, we have already mentioned Baron's commitment to world
simulating computer games as the engine of social change.444In junior
high school, Baron believes students should be taught about consequentialism, even though he acknowledges that it will "conflict with intui~

---

440. Professor Sunstein and his co-authors argue, however, that bureaucrats are more likely
to be protected from such popular pressures than judges and legislators. See Jolls et al., supra
note 139. at 48.
441. Id.
442. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1323 n.877; see also Sunstein, supra note 5, at
250; BARON. supra note 6. at 196.
443. BARON,supra note 6, at 196.
444. See id. at 201.
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tions that students and their parents have."445In high school, he argues
all students should be taught a course in "social theory. "446 This course
ought to be frankly ideological, teaching students "the basic ideas of the
free market and why it leads to efficient outcomes,"447asking students
to perform "simplified cost-benefit analysis"448 of regulations, and
teaching them about the biases that might pervert their own decision
making. As for college students, Baron finds it "disturbing" that many
have not been exposed to deterrence based theories of criminal punishment, and might require mandatory courses in welfare economic concepts for all students.449
Baron makes clear that he believes students (and the citizenry)
should understand that economics is not truly political. He appears to
believe that if citizens "walk through" basic economic problems, they
will become convinced that the validity of more complicated welfare
economic policy proposals does not simply rest on value judgment^.^"
This would, presumably, make welfare analyses less vulnerable to political protest by opponents of their normative proposals; it would inoculate welfare economics against charges of moral sectarianism.
We refrain from passing judgment here on the morality of such social techniques. However, we imagine several significant practical hurdles to re-education. These problems fall loosely within the following
three categories: lack of resources, secrecy, and unintended consequences.
First, it is likely that at least some of these proposals would require
significantly increasing the involvement of the federal government in
the public education of its young citizens. Absent federal involvement,
there would be no way to be sure that each state was teaching its citizenry utilitarian thinking at the same rate, a consequence of federalism/localized-education that would create huge complexities in welfare
analyses of the effects of legal rules.451Moreover, the federal education
budget does not now, as a general matter, force states to teach specific
subjects. Changing the structure of the educational system to create a
nationally uniform subject matter would clearly entail serious constitu445. Id. at 197.
446. Although he argues that such a course might be available "at first" on an elective only
basis. Id. at 196.
447. Id. at 197.
448. BARON,supra note 6, at 19G.
449. Id.
450. See id. at 197.
451. For example, under local educational control residents of Massachusetts might learn
consequentialist decision-making; residents of Alabama might not. In that case, perhaps the
ability to implement legal policies and rules created through welfare economic analysis would
have to vary state by state, creating the need for inefficient jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction tailoring.
Who knows?
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tional and political entanglements, and scholars have not yet even begun
to consider how these issues would work out.
Even assuming that academics could successfully create a uniform
utilitarian education program, such a program would fall victim to the
same problems as policies of secrecy discussed above. If individuals
knew that their children were being educated in utilitarian decisionmaking, and then found out that the program hoped to create a society
of thinkers comfortable with utilitarianism, popular outrage might be
considerable. Parents, after all, would not yet have been re-educated to
appreciate consequentialism, and might therefore be offended by the
Big-Brother-like, traditional-morality-destroying program. This belief,
however irrational, could create a serious political obstacle.
Third, the re-education program, if it worked, might destroy the altruistic and social norms that bind society together. Professors Kaplow
and Shavell acknowledge that many internalized social norms push individuals to behave in society's interest rather than their
If people were consistently consequentialist, "they might act in their selfinterest," which would not maximize overall welfare.453It is for this
reason they argue for a difference between the principles that guide
legal policy analysts and the principles that guide ordinary individuals
in their lives.454
This concern is not entirely fanciful. There is evidence that studying economics-whose modes of reasoning are relentlessly consequentialist-makes a person less altruistic, less involved in one's community, and more politically conservative.455 Some studies report that
economists are more likely than other educated individuals to give nothing to charity over the course of a year.456Economists are also more
likely, despite their knowledge of game theory, to be "defectors" (that
is, to act self-interestedly) in iterations of the famous "prisoner's dilemma. "457 Most disturbingly, education in economics appears to retard
the onset of a general tendency toward altruism that normally increases
with age, experience, and maturity.458
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1305.
Id.
See id. at 1306 n.836.
See, e.g., Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, J .
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1993, at 159 [hereinafter Inhibit Cooperarion]; see also Robert H. Frank
et al., Do Economisrs Make Bad Citizens?, J . ECON. PERSP., Winter 1996, at 187. Professors
Kaplow and Shavell argue that the data on this issue is mixed. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note
3. at 1369 n.993 (citing sources). However. the very fact that there is some data tending to support their intuition that consequentialism is at odds with the norms that hold society together
should make them wary about implementing a re-education campaign on any broad basis.
456. See Inhibit Cooperation. supra note 455, at 162.
457. See id. at 163-65.
458. See id. at 168 (showing a gap in defection rates between economics majors and nonmajors tends to widen as students move toward graduation).
452.
453.
454.
455.
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Under present conditions, we suspect that a program of consequentialist re-education that was ambitious enough to make a difference
would be self-defeating, disastrous, or otherwise seriously impractical.

E.

Limiting the Scope of Law and Economics Based Reform

Less fanciful responses to these problems are available. In Part 11,
the most pointed empirical evidence of law-related preferences concerned two aspects of common-law adjudication: procedural justice
(1I.B) and the assessment of punitive damages in tort (1I.D). Intuitively,
these fields form part of the "moral heartland" of the legal system.
They are domains where the influence of fairness and moral values on
the legal system is likely to be at a zenith. (The criminal law of malum
in se offenses is another such domain.) To be sure, some of the evidence in Part 1I.C does deal with other fields of law, and the evidence
we have assembled may fall in the "moral heartland" simply because
that is where researchers have chosen to direct their attentions. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that analysts must be especially cautious
in devising policies that will extend welfare economic norms into these
common-law fields.
Confirming this view, we find that those economic analysts who
seek to reform the common-law fields, such as Kaplow, Shavell, Sunstein, and Viscusi, also propose the most dramatic responses to lawrelated preferences, such as secrecy and increased bureaucratic control.
By contrast, one senses that there is less public awareness, hence less
public concern, with domains such as administrative agency regulation.
No one doubts that administrative regulations, especially on the federal
level, can have major welfare effects. But the technicality and intricacy
of most matters of agency concern do not seem to arouse the same passion in the public at large as the issues presented in tort disputes,
criminal cases, and the like.459Of course, these hunches need to be confirmed by empirical research. Still, it may be a sensible strategy for
legal economists to limit their attention to areas such as administrative
regulation, which have important effects on well-being, yet where tastes
for fairness and law-related preferences are likely to play a smaller
role.
Professors Adler and Posner's normative position gains considerably in credibility and appeal because it is expressly limited in applica-

459. This is not always the case. Environmental regulatory disputes, in particular. can raise
strong passions. More psychological pitfalls may confront a typical EPA economic analyst who
seeks to gauge the effects of a regulation on well-being than would confront a typical FTC economic analyst in the same position.
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tion to the domain of cost-benefit analysis by regulatory agencies.460
Academics have recently paid intense attention to the specific foundations of agency cost-benefit analysis.46' This may simply reflect the fact
that agency rulemaking is, at present, the locus in the real-world legal
system. But it may also reflect a more or less conscious intuition that
the agency regulation field is less likely to present the minefield of individual preferences that may complicate the analysis of common-law
fields.
Adler and Posner make another important concession. They stipulate that because of the problem of wealth effects, available practical
techniques may be inadequate to deal with situations where the affected
individuals differ widely in
This, too, is an important concession that increases the plausibility of Adler and Posner's overall normative position.

IV. CONCLUSION
What is the answer to our title question? The recent scholarship discussed in this Article represents an important step toward developing a
satisfactory normative position in law and economics. Of course, scholars who outright reject the sort of broadly consequentialist moral principles defended by Kaplow and Shavell, Adler and Posner, and Chang
will dismiss our title question with a curt "no." We appreciate that
forceful criticisms of consequentialist morality exist. We have, however, chosen to place such direct philosophical criticism mostly outside
the scope of this Article.
The connection between principle and practice in law and economics is still not close enough. One obstacle is wealth effects and interpersonal utility comparisons in general. They pose an unsolved problem.
The psychological data that we analyzed in the previous two parts
suggest that a consistent, preference-based reform of the legal system
faces practical problems. The welfare effects of any given change in
legal rules will be complicated and unpredictable. Furthermore, since
these effects will not often involve goods with a market price, it will be
hard for economists to measure their magnitudes. There is a real need
to develop improved standards for incorporating poll, survey, and other
experimental data in the welfare calculus.
Moreover, law-related preferences seriously complicate the issue of
460. In this Article we have nevertheless considered the applicability of Adler and Posner's
improved version of cost-benefit analysis to common-law fields. Adler and Posner's decision to
confine their prescriptions to the agency regulation field is not logically required by the rest of
their position.
461. See generally Implementing Cost-Benefir, supra note 15.
462. See Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 246.

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 53:2:335

designing appropriate institutions to put welfare economic principles
into practice. Scholars who have addressed this issue find themselves
tempted into paternalism. For example, in order to implement a principled commitment to optimal deterrence, analysts recommend removing
the jury's age-old power to punish bad actors with punitive damages.
Others hope to reduce citizens' role in formulating legal policy by creating two sets of legal discourse: one for public consumption, and one
for legal elites. Such proposals are practically problematic, because of
the difficulty of enacting them. And they are also morally troubling.
In the end, the answer to our title question depends in large part on
the results of future empirical research, and on the scope of legal
economists' ambitions. Even giving legal economists the best data that
they could hope for, we suspect that their proper, moral, role will be
limited to the most arcane corners of our regulatory state. Can law and
economics be both practical and principled? With respect to the common law and its moral heartland, we think not.

